Ann Cahill begins by reviewing feminist theories of rape that have either defined it as violence-not-sex (ala Brownmiller) or not-really-different-from-regular-sex (ala MacKinnon). She argues that neither of these theories take sufficient account of rape as an embodied experience that is both violet and sexual in a very distinct way. I think that she is too dismissive of MacKinnon, who clearly recognized the violence (not just the sex) of rape.

Cahill builds her theory of rape on the sexual-difference feminism of Luce Irigaray. I have not read Irigaray myself, so I cannot evaluate Cahill's use of her theory. Irigaray via Cahill argues that sexual difference is fundamental to humanity, and that understanding that difference enables us to understand, and celebrate, other forms of difference. This sexual difference should not be understood as patriarchal biologism, nor should it be defined by any of the characteristics that are in any given context associated with women. While it's clearly related to the female body and in particular genitalia, but beyond that I am unclear as to how the significance of sexual difference should be used.

Cahill argues that understanding embodiment is essential to understanding subjectivity. She rejects the liberal enlightenment model that defines personhood by a capacity for rationality that rests on a mind/body duality. Instead, she argues that embodiment leads to an intersubjectivity in which the self is defined through its relationality and dependence on others. This leads her to argue that rape is best understood as sexually specific violent assault on a woman's subjectivity.

She rests this argument on the idea that because one's personhood is tied to one's body, an assault on one's body is inherently an attack on one's personhood. However, she does not adequately explain why a sexual assault is more of an attack on personhodd than other forms of attack. ( )