Having had this book on various TBR lists pretty much since it came out, I had two main concerns. One, was this going to be the sort of book that only a trained staff officer could love, as I no longer have the patience I used to have. Two, being over a decade old, would this work already feel dated. On the whole, I now regret not getting around to this work sooner, as Boff does a good job of examining the various mono-causal explanations for British success in the end-game of the war and, as one might expect with mono-causal explanations, finds most of them wanting.

While the influx of American troops in 1918 was a prerequisite for victory, and the British military did show a great deal of growth in terms of tactical and operational competence, Boff still thinks that you can overrate those developments. It might be more accurate to say that the Germans played a weak hand badly and that Erich Ludendorff had lost his "grip" by the time the "Hundred Days" commenced. Whereas the much maligned British leadership displayed tenacity, flexibility, and drive when going in for the kill. Neither lions nor donkeys, but perhaps a pack of wolves.

I'm now looking forward to reading Boff's study of Bavarian Crown Prince Rupprecht as a commander. ( )