Jeffrey Record

Contrary to the author's main thesis, I think that this work (as well as Mr. Record's 's 2009 book titled "Japan's Decision for War in 1941: Some Enduring Lessons") demonstrates that: especially in a constitutional democracy where there is a separation of powers respecting the waging of war, isolationist and pacifistic sentiments tend to undermine the effectiveness of aggressive "deterrent" policies---which paradoxically means that isolationism, pacifism, and the slow use of economic sactions (that coincidentally harm civilians) instead of quick and decisive armed conflict (that coincidentlly harms less civilians than does strangling economic sanctions applied over many months or years), actually leads to war rather than to deterrence and peace.… (altro)

Appeasement has had quite a troubled history. Ever since Chamberlain's disastrous 1938 trip to Munich, it has become akin to something like "coddler" or "traitor." Munich has become an analogy for the need to be able and willing to use force early. Presidents from Truman to Bush have invoked it to support policies from the defense against aggression to preemptive invasion. In the lead-up to the Iraq war, the Bush administration used Munich's legacy as a key part of their public appeal. We're now dealing with the results.

Jeffrey Record's The Specter of Munich takes a critical look at this pervasive metaphor. The book is divided into two sections. The first describes the pre-war historical situation to try to learn why appeasement was tried and why it failed. The second suggests some conclusions to be drawn beyond the obvious and applies them to the current strategic situation.

Record's evocation of British and French decision-making is compelling. He argues that giving up the Sudetenland only in hindsight appears as a tragic mistake. Hitler's deeply ideological motivation wasn't apparent to many at the time, not even to the German conservative nationalists who would later plot his death. Nor did anyone realize the horriffic crimes the regime would plot, even if it was already hysteric about race. Fundamentally, Record shows that it wasn't clear just how unappeasable Hitler was. If he had been a simple realist or militarist, appeasement might very well have prevented a war. If he had died the day after the agreement, there might not have been a war.

And here is the problem for Munich's applicability as a metaphor: very few, perhaps no, enemies reach the level of Hitler's ruthlessness, cunning, aggression and capability. Invoking Munich paradoxically makes war more likely by limiting one's options to military action or concession. Rather than be bound by a mildly-appropriate metaphor, strategy must be grounded on an intelligent, critical examination of the world. Sometimes this may mean giving up certain interests in return for larger ones.

Record follows this history by applying other lessons from Munich to our current war in Iraq and broader strategy. He marshalls an impressive array of information in showing how the US strategic establishment has learned too little from 1938. We have learned that a strong military capable of credibly backing up threats can be necessary, but we have not learned that predictability in issuing those threats is vital. We've excoriated French failure to follow the trends of war at the same time we build a force totally unsuitable for the wars we are likely to face. And we've heard how terribly wrong France and Britain were about Hitler's motivations and Germany's military as we face the prospect of a continuing war based on huge miscalculations.

The Specter of Munich is fantastic as both history and strategic application. It is a short, readable demolition of one of the biggest canards in public discourse. Hopefully the next time some talking head on TV disdainfully calls someone an appeaser, they'll be set right. But that's doubtful.… (altro)