Jeffrey M. Moore

In this monograph, the author sets himself the interesting task of examining on an operation by operation basis how Chester Nimitz's intelligence machine went about its business and considers what went right, what went wrong, and what might have been done to generate a better result. In particular, the lack of control over intelligence-gathering platforms might have been the so-called Joint Intelligence Center-Pacific Ocean Area's biggest lack.

I have very few complaints about this work, but there are a few gaffs that set me off. One is when Moore describes Ulysses S. Grant, as opposed to George McClellan, as being dependent on the Pinkerton Agency for intelligence; a point that a student of the intelligence process should be aware of. Two, Moore attributes too much independent influence to the Imperial Japanese Army in pre-war Japanese politics, without seeming to be aware of its silent civilian partners, or how it was not a monolith in and of itself. Finally, Moore attributes an intelligence impact on the design of the Vought F4U Corsair, when this plane was first flown in May of 1940; too early for war-time intelligence to matter. It's throwaway points such as these that make me wonder a little bit about the author's scholarship.… (altro)