Donald KaganRecensioni

Tapa dura ilustrada. Mapas.
Muy buen estado

Durante tres décadas, en el siglo V a. C., el mundo fue devastado por una gran guerra tan dramática, decisiva y destructiva como las guerras mundiales del siglo XX: la guerra del Peloponeso, un episodio clave para entender el desarrollo posterior del mundo occidental y una sucesión interminable de batallas que inauguraba una época de brutalidad y destrucción sin precendentes en la historia. El relato contemporáneo a los hechos de Tucídides es la fuente principal para conocer esos acontecimientos, pero no la única, y en eso destaca Donald Kagan: en la escrupulosa y brillante contextualización de fuentes y hechos históricos. A partir de su ya clásica y aún no superada Historia de la guerra del Peloponeso en cuatro volúmenes, el autor, con estilo ágil y colorista que lo caracteriza, sintetiza en este ensayo varios años de guerras entre la alianza espartana y el imperio ateniense, el ascenso y caída de un mundo que sigue sirviéndonos aún hoy de punto de referencia para entender el presente. Y gracias a esa labor de investigación, estudio y resumen, nos ofrece una de las mejores obras de ensayo histórico sobre un conflicto bélico; una espléndida crónica del auge y caída de un imperio y de unos tiempos oscuros cuyas lecciones cobran pleno sentido en nuestros días. Sin duda, una referencia para todos los estudios y amantes del mundo antiguo. Una obra maestra sobre uno de los temas principales de la historia de la Antigüedad Clásica.

Donald Kagan (Kuršėnai, Lituania, 1 de mayo de 1932-Washington D. C., Estados Unidos, 6 de agosto de 2021)1​ fue un historiador estadounidense de la Universidad Yale especializado en la historia de Grecia, notable por sus cuatro volúmenes de la Guerra del Peloponeso. Fue deán del Yale College de 1989 a 1992.

An absorbing book, providing a deep insight into what really causes, or leads to, armed interactions among countries and peoples. The chapters on the two world wars are especially absorbing. I, for one, got fresh insights into the role of individual leaders and statesmen like Bismarck, who balanced the European west and the east tirelessly and kept them from going to war. After his retirement, however, the bellicose factions gained ascendancy and took Europe into a devastating war. By drawing on the early examples of Sparta-Athens divisions in ancient Greece and the Rome-Carthage wars a little later, the author repeatedly makes the point that it is not only greed for plunder or land that leads to war between nations, but also, perhaps more usually, feelings of not being respected or given a just deal. Wars often become inevitable because of national pride and remembered or resurrected instances of humiliation or betrayal. His chapter on the Cuban missile crisis does not appear to me to be on par with the other examples, as he seems to be oscillating toward and away from a hawkish stance, and seems to be accusing John Kennedy of projecting a weak and pusillanimous character to the rough and bumptious Kruschev. On the whole, however, this author's analysis and insights into war and peace should surely improve our understanding of the current crises as well.

Read pages 285-307 during WWI portion of S&W at CNCS in Sept 2023.

From the syllabus: He also describes the end of the war and the problems of establishing a stable peace.
Key quotes: “The eventual superiority of sixty-five million Germans with greater natural resources over thirty-nine million Frenchmen with a lower birthrate was not checked by the Versailles Treaty.” P295
“The tragedy of the Treaty of Versailles was that it was neither conciliatory enough to remove the desire for change, even at the cost of war, nor harsh enough to make another war impossible.” P297

Durante tres décadas del siglo V a.C., el mundo fue devastado por una guerra tan dramática, decisiva y destructiva como las guerras mundiales del siglo XX: la Guerra del Peloponeso, un episodio clave para entender el desarrollo posterior del mundo occidental y una guerra que inauguraba una época de brutalidad y destrucción sin precedentes en la historia.

12/2/22

OBB-1

This is a densely packed history textbook. There is a wealth of knowledge that covers European history up to 1715. I found this book difficult to read through albeit there is much to learn. It is not entertaining but is factual.

There was a time when every educated person had to learn Latin and Greek; The Gallic War and The Civil War (Caesar) for Latin and The Persian Wars (Herodotus) and The Peloponnesian War (Thucydides) for Greek. By the time I got to college, you no longer read them in the original languages, but Introduction to Western Civilization at the University of Chicago still required them (student unrest compelled UofC to add “History of Africa Civilization”, “History of Oriental Civilization” and “History of Russian Civilization” as alternates shortly afterward). Did it do me any good to study the ancients? Well, I don’t think it hurt me any; I probably would have read these on my own sooner or later. The instructors kept trying to kept things relevant by linking things to current events; the Vietnam War was in full swing at the time and there was plenty of opportunity to compare Athens to the US. The popularity of the Greeks and their battles may be on the upswing with books like Gates of Fire and movies like 300, so it’s perhaps apropos that historian Donald Kagan has produced a condensation of his four-volume history of the conflict between Athenians and Spartans.


The book is good, but not great. Kagan’s approach to the classical history is, well, classical – his sources are Thucydides, Xenophon, Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch, plus a scattering of fragments from other ancient authors. He does do considerable speculation on the strategies and ideas of the participants, and those speculations are cogent and usually convincing. What the book lacks, unfortunately, is background. The reader is assumed to be knowledgeable about ancient Greek history – which means she’s already read all the authors Kagan cites. There’s nothing here drawn from archaeology; little to no discussion of how a hoplite army actually fought or how a trireme navy was outfitted and supplied. (One exception is Kagan’s discussion of the catastrophic defeat of the Athenian navy at Syracuse, where the Syracusans modified their ships to counter the usually devastating Athenian diekplous, but that’s about it – and even then it isn’t really clear exactly what the Syracusans did. An illustration, even a speculative one, would have been worth 1000 words).


My own background reading helped a lot to fill in the blanks Kagan leaves. For example, Kagan notes that the Athenians were usually dominant at sea because of “better training”; a casual reader might think “Well, how much training does it take to row a boat?”. The answer seems to be “A lot, for a trireme”. A trireme was packed to the gunwales with rowers; only the top row of oarsmen could actually see their oars contact the water. The diekplous tactic involved opposing triremes playing a game of nautical chicken, approaching ram to ram. At the last second before head-on contact, the Athenian steersman would swerve to one side, and simultaneously all the oarsmen on that side would pull their oars in – meaning an already packed rowing space now had a bunch of 16-foot poles sticking into it - doing that without bashing your rowing mates in the head or getting your oars tangled up, yes, I imagine that did require some practice. Now the Athenians cruised down the side of the enemy trireme; if they weren’t exactly as well trained and alert as the Athenians some to all of their oars were still sticking out and got snapped off, creating havoc inside (remember, all of the rowers had their backs to the other ship and two thirds of them couldn’t see outside anyway; thus everything depended on the skill of the steersman). Experiments with the replica trireme Olimpias demonstrated that a skilled crew could bring a trireme to a stop, turn it 180° in its own length, and re-accelerate to 6 knots in 60 seconds. So the opposing trireme had now had half its oars snapped off; the force of the impact had swung it in the water so it was now at right angles to its original heading – and the Athenians had turned around and were now approaching it ram to broadside at 6 knots. It’s not surprising at all that it took the Spartans a long time to match the Athenians at sea – since the Athenians controlled the Peloponnesian coast for most of the war, the Spartans never had a chance to take their crews out and practice – and the final “naval” battle was actually fought on land, at Aegospotami in the Hellespont, when Lysander surprised the Athenian fleet while most of the crews were foraging and landed enough hoplites to capture the Athenian triremes on shore.


Similarly, although Kagan notes numerous sieges in the war, there’s no explanation on what was involved. No siege weapons had been invented yet (Assyrian and Egyptian armies had siege towers, but the news never made it to Greece). There were no catapults and mining wasn’t used (Kagan doesn’t even mention the idea; I suspect the soil in most of Greece wasn’t conducive). Thus the only way to capture a walled city was to have traitors inside open the gates (the usual method) or starve it out. (The walls of Athens – or more precisely the walls connecting Athens to the port of Piraeus – were what precipitated the war in the first place; the Spartans realized a walled Athens was essentially invulnerable and demanded that the Athenians tear them down).


Both Kagan and the ancient authors devoted a lot of attention to politics of Athens – but there’s no single clear explanation on how that worked. As near as I can tell, for most of the war the Athenians had a “true” democracy; every enfranchised citizen could show up at the assembly and vote. “Generals” (Kagan’s translation of “archons”) were elected but there is no explanation of how such an election worked. A number of Athenians – most notably Pericles – strongly influenced politics, but there’s very little discussion of how they accomplished that. Spartan politics gets even less attention; Kagan mentions the “ephors” and the “assembly” several times, but from my other reading on Sparta it isn’t clear exactly what powers the ephors had, and it seems like the gerousia – which Kagan doesn’t mention at all – actually had more power than the ephors did. There is some more explanation of Athenian politics near the end of the war, when an oligarchic coup de etat temporarily took control, and of the brave attempt by Socrates to stop the mass trial of the navarchs after the Battle of Arginusae.


I don’t want to sound too critical. I will say the book has excellent maps – every major land and naval battle is depicted (insofar as ancient sources allow it to be reconstructed) and there are overall maps of the major operating areas. The book’s an easy read; Kagan’s writing style is clear and straightforward. As mentioned, Kagan’s analysis of the tactics and strategy of the conflict always seems on target. Interestingly, despite their reputations, the aristocratic Spartans usually come across as vacillating and indecisive while the democratic Athenians are aggressive and usually seize opportunity with successful results. Kagan refrains from drawing analogies to modern politics, although there’s certainly plenty of opportunity for it; the Athenians were winning when they decided to commit the bulk of their land and naval forces to a disastrous attack on Syracuse, which was far outside their area of interest and another democracy; the Spartans, although justifying the war as “liberators” of Greece from Athenian domination, eventually negotiated a treaty with Persia that would have returned all the Greek cities on mainland Asia plus the Aegean Islands to Darius II.


I’m not really sure how to judge this book; it’s an enjoyable enough read but I think it could have been a lot better if Kagan had spent less time recapitulating the ancient authors and more time explaining what life, warfare and politics were like in their times.½

Kagan's analysis of Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War including lessons for the future, cause, factionalism, first binding arbitration, categories of history, first known economic embargo

Una detallada historia de la guerra del peloponeso. Con comentarios políticos interesante. Ameno libro

I should have read The Peloponnesian War before I read Xenophon's Anabasis. Xenophon's work takes place shortly after the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) and that event sets the context of the relationship between the Athenian Greeks and the Spartans. One can see generals like Demosthenes and Lysander as influencing how Xenophon would have led, as well as learn what was expected of Athenian commanders both on the battlefield and in the realm of politics.

Donald Kagan is apparently the world's foremost expert on this event, and his works on it seem unassailable. Kagan's goal is to bring his academic research into a format more relevant to the modern reader who is familiar with modern wars and politics. While some reviews on Amazon have criticized this work as being "dry" or "too detailed," I disagree; it was a long and historically consequential war involving various people groups and cultures and is more than just "Athenians" vs. "Spartans." It is also "Ionians" vs. "Dorians" and others. The modern reader (myself) may tend to forget that in this period there was no united "Greece," the Aegean was all loose affiliations of independent and democratic city states that fell under the influence of larger city states. Spartans and Athenians had differing cultures and political structures and did not get along.

One is struck by the parallels between this war and 20th century wars. You have a problem/conflict in a far-off territory supported by a superpower, which begins to pull in other regional powers and eventually grows into a major war between superpowers. What looks like a quick-and-easy war turns into a costly quagmire. Democratic institutions get subverted in the name of defending the country, and much blood and treasure is robbed from future generations. During the war, people do things so far outside cultural norms and accepted morality that it cracks the very foundations of their civilizations. The question of how to have "peace with honor" for both sides in a potential stalemate becomes the issue. Bold speeches lead to disastrous actions, and popular sentiment changes with news of each battle's result. Borders get redrawn setting the stage for future conflicts.

Greece early on was moving from a true democracy to a "republic of the first citizen," where a general or other man of consequence had actual power and sway beyond statutes. By the end of the war, many of its cultural institutions were badly undermined and it was no longer an empire.


In the first phase of the war, the "Archidamian War," Athens was influenced by Pericles to adopt a defensive strategy-- to resist until the Spartans see they cannot be beaten. To rely heavily on its naval advantage while Sparta relies on its superior infantry. After Pericles death, the Athenians begin having some success on offense and adopt a more aggressive strategy. Good tactics and luck swing the war into Athens' favor, but they overreach at a point where they could have achieved very favorable terms with Sparta and expanded their empire. Instead, the Spartans achieve some victories and sue for a more favorable peace.

In the interim, both Sparta and Athens wage a sort of proxy war by supporting opposite sides of other regional conflicts. Athens and their allies experience major defeats, which is foreboding for the next chapter of the conflict.

When Athenian allies are attacked by Spartan-backed Syracusans in Sicily, Alcibiades convinces the Athenian assembly to mount a massive expedition to crush Syracuse and incorporate Sicily into the empire. After this meets with disastrous defeat, Alcibiades is convicted of treason and flees to Sparta-- effectively turning traitor and convincing the Spartans to follow his advice in attacking Athens! Athens ends up doubling down on its Sicilian campaign, resulting in almost the complete destruction of its navy, infantry, and the loss of city states as the balance of power shifts in Sparta's favor. Nicias opposes the Sicilian expedition but gets appointed as a general, and ends up the last remaining general on the expedition after Alcibiades is arrested and others are killed. Generals who experienced bad results in the battlefield, even if there were a good excuse, were routinely disgraced, tried, executed, or banished. Demosthenes suggests the army retreat to defend Athens but Nicias hesitates both due to fear of returning to Athens and because of a solar eclipse that soothsayers say is an omen to wait before retreating. The Syracusans press the attack and destroy the Athenian forces and execute Nicias and Demosthenes.

While Athens now fears mass uprisings and Spartan conquest, the Spartans face the problem of not having a strong enough navy to finish off the Athenians and Alcibiades convinces them to seek alliance with Persia for help. The Spartan's supposed desire to defeat Athens "for the independence of Greek states" becomes subverted to their desire for victory as they're willing to sacrifice Greeks to Persian rule.

Meanwhile in Athens in 411 B.C., a group of 400 wealthy Athenians stage a coup, replacing Athenian democracy with oligarchic rule and eliminating lower classes from serving on juries or being able to participate in government. They promise that it will be "temporary" in order to save money and prevent the demise of Athens and will eventually restore democracy to a larger group of 5,000. The 400 desire to change the Constitution to bring back Alcibiades, who they falsely believe has Persian support and can enlist Persian help to to defend Athens. They elect Alcibiades as general and he now plays his newfound power as a sort of negotiation chip with the Persians. The coup fails as the outraged navy at Samos depose their generals and elect new ones, now with a desire to attack Athens and restore democracy by force. Kagan does a good job explaining the players in the complicated political intrigue, from moderates who calculatingly went along with the 400 to those who really would eliminate Athenian democracy in the name of defense. As the coup falls apart, the moderates execute the extremists, building monuments to their treachery. The 400 become the 5,000, and eventually Athens reverts to full democracy. Meanwhile, the Persians who had promised aid to Sparta are slow in delivering and the price the Spartans pay is costly in terms of money and morale.

Alcibiades and the Athenian navy score some victories against the Peloponnesians, and the Spartans sue for peace-- which the Athenians reject because they would not accept the status quo with so many of their former colonies, including Byzantium and Ephesus, under Spartan control.Eventually, the Peloponnesian forces allied with Persia and led by Lysander defeat the Athenian navy decisively in 406 B.C. (ending Alcibiades' command) and in 404 B.C., effectively wiping out the Athenian navy. Lysander kills all his prisoners, which hardens Athenians' resolve to hold out under siege. The Athenians negotiate a final peace where they agree to give up their colonies and raze their walls, but maintain their liberty.

Lysander and the Spartans then impose their will on Athens and other colonies, setting up oppressive oligarchies and extractive institutions. "Greek independence" was never actually intended. However, Sparta would end up facing costly revolts and wars with Thebes and conflicts with Persia that would eventually cause its demise. Within a year of the peace treaty, Athens had restored its democracy, rebuilt its walls, and restored many of its colonies. The cost of the war was high, with about half of the adult male population of Athens wiped out by either war, plague, or famine.

I learned a great deal from this epic work, I give it 5 stars.

Because of a dearth of primary source materials author Kagan must progress here by way of thematic chapters: "The Statesman," "The Visionary," "The Peacemaker," and so on. We see the people, the buildings, the wars, the navy, the art, the pantheism, the slaves, the empire, the rebellions, the legal system, etc., but there's very little about the man himself, which I suppose is not surprising 2,400 years later. This was fine with me as I tend to dislike the traditional cradle-to-grave biographical story arc. In terms of primary sources there's Pericles's Funeral Oration reported by Thucydides in his History of the Peloponessian War and I think two other speeches. There's Plutarch's biography, written 400 years after the fact, and various mentions here and there. That's it. So Kagan is stuck with providing an overarching view of Pericles's times and locale. Still I found a lot to like about the book because what I wanted was a refresher on the way the Athenian Empire was formed and how it was maintained. Kagan spent about twenty years writing his four volume opus on the Peloponnesian War before undertaking his slimmer, more condensed version (The Peloponnesian War, Viking, 2003). So almost every line in the later volume has the sonorous ring that you'd expect from a lifetime's immersion in one's subject matter. The creation of Pericles of Athens one suspects was not so felicitous. There are two turgid patches that I skipped: one at the end of "The Peacemaker," the other at the end of "The Educator." Otherwise smooth sailing. It's perhaps not surprising that Kagan's later chapters on the Peloponnesian War are his strongest. These constitute a condensed almost capsule overview of the conflict. Interesting, too, uncanny in fact, is how many of the diplomatic moves made by Pericles during that conflict resemble 20th-century geopolitical maneuvering. Kagan without too much effort establishes the workings of this brilliant political mind. Recommended with some reservations. PS: I have a smart friend here at GR who is highly knowledgable about the cutting edge scholarship of this period. Let's be clear, this book is not for such a person. It is for the general reader.

This book is wonderful because it takes Thucydides classic text--itself a wonder--and fills in the gaps, or corrects the ancient text where necessary. Thucydides is cited throughout in a manner reminiscent of the notation used to cite Biblical chapter and verse. In addition, Kagan refers to the writings of Plutarch, Xenophon, Diodorus, Socrates, Aristophanes, and others, especially for the last seven years of the war, a period Thucydides does not cover. Like any scholar worth his salt, Kagan is conversant with the scholarly consensus, with which he is for the most part in step, though he occasionally offers alternative scenarios. Much of the book is simply riveting. Like when the Spartan general Brasidas retakes Amphipolis, or the naval battle fought late in the war for control of the Hellespont. Woven throughout is the longer story of the Athenian turncoat, Alcibiades. Professor Kagan preceded this one-volume history with a four-volume history of the war that took him around 20 years to write. That 4-volume series is a much more detailed consideration of political motives and military strategy. But with this single volume, Kagan was able to produce a fast-moving tale, full of incident and colorful description. I am not a great reader of military histories; most, in my experience, are a boring slog. But because of Kagan's previous in-depth consideration of the same events, and the need to get the story told in a mere 485 pages, the result is a taut, compressed narrative that moves briskly and bears the reader delightedly along.

This book thoroughly covers the battles of the Peloponnesian war, along with the political back story of the era. The account was very detailed, and the story of Alcibaides? was quite interesting. I found the political details rather tedious after a while, and couldn't wait for the next battle. I find it amazing that the leaders were all well rounded generals who functioned as naval commanders when necessary. Generals who were active politicians.

I write this with the "hindsight" of the present, 2014.

Professor Kagan began as a liberal immigrant, and in early 2000s became a voice of neo-conservative concerns which saw a need for a strong military to defend against some as yet un-perceived "enemy". He compares the history of England's post-WWI policies summed up in the Unitarian widely-held delusion voiced by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlin -- "peace in our time" -- to America's post-WWII policies.

However, the professor's great expertise with the eternal wars of the Peloponnese (of Achea and Attica, in four volumes, and a 5th which summarizes them), fails him in finding false parallels between the post-war periods and the policies of the British and the Americans.

Professor Kagan fails to research, much less interview, the players -- Gorbachev, the USSR military, Ho Chi Minh, etc. -- and fails to identify the fact that the USSR collapsed from within, while Saudi-funded Wahhabi extremism began its ascendency. He fails to identify the role of the plutocracy, so critical in the Greek model. America was not "sleeping" -- it was deliberately kept distracted by domestic terrorists operating IRS 501c3 front organizations who attacked Our Government and weakened the democracy from within.

Worse, while calling for an even more robust military, he fails to identify what weapons-systems are needed. He fails to analyze the military situation under President Reagan -- the withdrawal from the middle east with the Beirut Bombing killing 300 Marines in barracks and resulting in the take-over and ascendancy of Islamic troops using terrorist tactics. The invasion of Granada -- in which our finest amphibious assault troops were pinned down on the beach by three Cuban machine gun nests. Reagan dramatically increased our military spending and the National Debt, with nothing to show for it. No facts show that the USSR collapsed as a result of any weapon the US produced. The USSR knew that the Bradley Fighting Vehicle could not fight, and the million-dollar-a-copy anti-missile missiles rarely knocked down even the most primitive Iraqi missiles in the first Bush War.

Far from identifying appropriate weapon-procurement systems, or suggesting how to defend against an actual "enemy", the author fails to assess the MIE (Military Industrial Establishment of which Eisenhower presciently-warned), fails to warn that it has bled us with an enormous, and practically worthless, war machine, and fails to assess or identify the "enemy". He fuels the industrial weaponized mind-set, leaving us with the fear which the plutocracy is trying to ignite.

Extremely helpful overview of the people, places, politics, and dilemmas involved in the Peloponnesian War. Really opens up Thucydides' account.

a well-written account of the peloponnesian war, this book provides you with everything you want to know this period in history. It is fast-paced and never dull. It also has excellent maps that will allow you to see the grand scale of this conflict. My only comment is that all maps should have been put in one place, like at the start, so i wont be flipping around the book looking for a particular map.

Representa un conflicto a nivel local en cuanto a extensión geográfica, pero equivale perfectamente a una contienda a un nivel superior por la cantidad de actores que intervienen en ella: tebanos, atenienses, espartanos, beocios, jonios, persas,..., así como los personajes a nivel individual, Perciles, Cleon, Arquidamo, Alcibíades, Lisandro,...
Muy bien llevada y fácil de leer. Sirve como piedra angular para seguir investigando acerca del tema tanto a los pueblos involucrados como a sus individualidades; así como el antes y después cronológico.

Read Pericles first to make sure you dig Kagan.

Donald Kagan, one of the foremost scholars of Ancient Greek history, wrote a concise but thorough history of the Peloponnesian War for a general audience based off his four-volume academic masterpiece on the same subject. From the start Kagan brings the reader to the time period of the war with enough background information that someone not familiar at all with Ancient Greece will understand the circumstances of the beginning of the war from each side's viewpoint. Throughout the work, Kagan brings in a modern military and political view to help examine decisions of either side that the ancient sources' explain as social virtue or vice. This supplement to the ancient sources helps give a fuller view of the decisions of the Athenians, Spartans, and their respective allies. If you want to learn about Ancient Greek history beyond Marathon or Thermopylae, I fully recommend this book.½

Incredible amount of detail about this ancient conflict, yet Kagan maintained my interest throughout. The contrast between a democracy(Athens) fighting a war and an oligarchy(Sparta) has interesting messages even for today, though in many ways this conflict seemed more like gang wars over territory in a city than the epic struggle portrayed here.

An excellent introduction to Greek war history. It may explain why Homer was so popular, and remains so. Those reading the book original could envision the geography and the idea of continous war. That the Greeks, Spartans, and Persians changed sides so often was amazing to me. Compaing this with 20th century war history look at the Russians ability to link to the Germans and then just as quickly the Americans.

I agree with what the Librarything reviewers have written. I found the generous number of maps especially valuable. I marked mine up as I went along.

Kagan effectively dissects Thucydides and although he is appreciative of Thucydides' scientific approach to history Kagan rightfully takes Thucydides to task for his selection and skewing of the Peloponnesian War.

This is a condensed version of Professor Kagan's four volume history of the Peloponnesian War. It's very well-written, not the least bit dry for those with an interest in ancient history. I was moved by many of the episodes he relates, particularly the conclusion to the Sicilian Expedition and the trial following the Battle of Arginusae. This is a must read for anyone with an interest in Greek history.

Una de las guerras más cruentas que ha vivido la humanidad vuelve al presente. La traducción del libro de Donald Kagan, La Guerra del Peloponeso, devuelve a nuestros días la brutal derrota de Atenas y sus aliados en pleno siglo de Pericles a manos de una disciplinada y fortísima Esparta. La victoria, si bien propició el liderazgo de los lacedemonios, fue pírrica si se mide el escaso tiempo que se mantuvieron a la cabeza del mundo griego, pues Tebas le arrebató el puesto apenas treinta años después y algo más tarde la Macedonia de Filipo y Alejandro acabaron incluso con ese viejo mundo.