Daniel J. Hughes

Count Helmut von Moltke was perhaps the greatest military leader during the period between Napoleon and the First World War. Moltke shaped the way that the German Army looked at war up until 1945. This book is a compendium of essays written by v. Moltke that covers many practical aspects of the art of war with historical examples. It's a bit of a turgid read unless this is your period. Moltke (intentionally) never set out to produce an 'On War'. He felt that that sort of work would be misused (as Clauswitz's is/was). What was important to Moltke was not a set of rules or principles, but rather a way of thinking. Initiative and control were stressed, "when in doubt advance toward the sound of the guns". . . While he had great respect for the Prussian philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz, whom he had limited contact with as a young staff officer, Moltke rejected several of Clausewitz's most important concepts, perhaps the most eventful being the place of the military in strategic decisions made during time of war. For Moltke the military should simply be allowed to fight the war to the finish at which time the political leadership would be allowed to negotiate the peace. Clausewitz saw war as the continuation of politics by other means, meaning that political decisions did not end with the commencement of hostilities but continued. Moltke's view won out in German military thinking, of course. Clever writers were even able to substantiate his stance with carefully selected quotes from Clausewitz. This doctrine, wielded poorly, ultimate caused Germany's catostrophic fall in WWI and WWII. According to Moltke, during the decision phase the commander must champion only one perspective to the green table. Once he has arrived at a decision, although it may not be the best, his subordinates should execute it resolutely. The consistent execution of even a mediocre plan will more often lead to victory (in the long-run) than an inconsistent execution of a great plan; hence, Molke's maxim that 'strategy grows silent in the face of the need for a tactical victory'. Moltke states that only a layman believes that it is possible to foresee and predict causal events deterministically in war.… (altro)