Aaron L. Friedberg

Aaron Friedberg seeks to explore whether or not the United States succumbed to statism during the Cold War. The outcome of the Cold War can be seen as something of a paradox: we might expect that the Soviet Union – with its command economy and commensurately greater relative ability to mobilize all national resources – would be likelier to prevail over its opponent, which possessed a much less centralized, but considerably larger, economy and relatively more limited ability to mobilize national resources. In light of the enormous pressures of the Cold War, Friedberg wants to understand how the United States was able to avoid statism and centralization of power in the executive branch. Friedberg thoroughly analyzed how the United States mobilized (and in many cases, failed to mobilize) manpower and resources for the development of industry, weapons, and technology. In every case, policymakers failed to enhance the power and role of the state to the extent that some believed necessary to defeat the Soviet Union. He argued that the divided nature of U.S. governmental and societal institutions, the long-standing influence of anti-interventionist interest groups and issues (e.g., domestic concerns even in the face of seemingly overwhelming international threats), and – especially – the American anti-statist ideological tradition were factors of U.S. success in the Cold War and the reasons why the United States was able to avoid becoming militarist and statist. Friedberg provided an interesting and in some ways cautionary argument that U.S. Cold War strategy was the result of a series of compromises and political bargaining necessitated by competing interest groups rather than a set of rational strategic calculations. While Friedberg's scholarship is good, his writing style is less than engaging. A bit of a snoozer, but if you're reading this book, you're probably sufficiently interested in the topic that it shouldn't matter much.

Review copyright 2009 J. Andrew Byers… (altro)