Christopher Duffy (1)Recensioni

This book discusses events that occurred at the end of WWII from the perspective of Soviet and Nazi operations and strategies on the eastern front. By 1945, German forces have been demoralized and under resourced for years, but the allies did not see that. In perpetration for a large operation in January, Russian troops were mobilized in secret with a campaign of disinformation about troop movements. When the operation began and broke through German front lines, they were able to gain long tracks of land without any battles due to the lack of German resources. Only at Berlin were the Soviets halted.

Over the course of the war, the Nazi command became more centralized. Strategies and decision were increasingly in the hands of Hitler all the while the armies were becoming fractured and disjointed. Generally, Hitler listened to military officials when the news was good such as a victory, but could never take a loss. Nazi military equipment was really powerful but only a fraction of the army was mechanized. The technology was superior up until the end of the war when the Allied technology started to catch up and supersede. The units that were mechanized tended to run out of resources such as ammunition and oil. Many tanks were abandoned not because they were destroyed, but because they did not have the oil to make them run.

Soviets entered the war with a deficiency in experienced army officials due to political purges. During the battles, Russians lost four units per every German one, which is partly why Russians lost the most people during the whole war. The only reason Russia was able to withstand the losses was because they were supplied with more people than they were losing. Resources available to the Russians were abundant, no matter how much ammunition was used.

The book presents information before and after the war which was very helpful to understand the situation in 1945, but most of the book deals with a few months in early 1945. Generally well written, but the war interactions lack depth into why the particular battles were important to the whole war. Most of the book is about the particular movement of troops but the way it is written does not facilitate an understanding of relevance to the whole situation. The maps shown do not aid much in showing what particular events are being described. Would have helped to add small map icons in pages describing movements to facilitate better understanding.

Taking the Age of Reason as approximately 1715-1789, Duffy seeks to portray what it was like to be a (European) soldier of the period, looking at both peacetime and wartime conditions. Most examples are from the campaigns of Frederick the Great, but the western theatre of the Seven Years War and the American Revolution* also make strong showings. The rank and file, regimental officers, and the high command all get dealt with.

A pretty good book, presuming some background knowledge but seemingly aimed at the general reader rather than the fellow expert. Citations are sparse but the bibliography is extensive, including many eighteenth century works. Unfortunately, the version I read was a carelessly done ebook (bought at Kobo), whose OCR errors and similar infelicities put a damper on my enjoyment.

* An interesting tidbit is that, apparently, French officers who fought for the American Revolution were slightly less likely to support the French one when it broke out some years later than colleagues who stayed in Europe.

Outdated and obsolete. So much knowledge about the Eastern Front has come out in since the fall of the USSR. Alot of Western versions of World War II in the east is not accurate.

A lively account of the Great Invasion, and the Russian response to the Napoleonic system. The maps are to me a considerable weak point, but if you can check the text to better maps the book is considerably enhanced.½

Christopher Duffy is a military historian whose writing never disappoints. His work about Suvorov’s 1799 campaign in Italy and Switzerland is a joy to read. If only the editors had been a little bit more quality-oriented regarding the spelling and the standardization of names. The focus of the book lies on Suvorov’s adventures in Northern Italy. The addition of Suvorov’s soldiers tipped the balance strongly in favor of the Austrians who, in contrast to Suvorov, did not want to risk their initial gains and very content with restoring control over their Italian territories. The Russians fought well against the French, led by quite a number of future marshals. The unsung hero of the Italian part of the campaign is Johann Gabriel Chasteler, Suvorov's chief of staff born in the Austrian Netherlands. His management skill in necessary logistics and command made his chief’s crazy ideas possible. While Suvorov force-marched his Russians against the enemy, Chasteler kept up the lines of supply and interior lines. Unfortunately for the Swiss part of the campaign, he was wounded and replaced by Franz von Weyrother who managed to have a hand in the destruction of not one but two Russian armies. Despite his failure in the Swiss campaign, he was assigned to design the order of battle at Austerlitz. His elaborate design proved to be as unsuitable for the Russian needs as the path selected across the Alps.

Suvorov went one Alpine pass too far in Switzerland: Instead of playing it safe and taking a route controlled by the Austrians, Suvorov took the direct route over the Saint Gotthard pass toward Altdorf which was defended by the French. In contrast to the mythology, the French were not present in strength and their defense was mostly accidental. The focus of French attention was in the Valais and in the Mittelland; the forces sent into the inhospitable Alpine regions served mostly as flank protection. Suvorov was defeated thus by his own (and Austrian) bad logistics and the predictably blocked exits to the Mittelland. The unnecessary necessary detour in horrible terrain, ably represented by Duffy's photographies, wrecked Suvorov’s constitution and his army. When the army finally emerged from its Alpine adventure, the Russian field artillery sent through less strenuous Austrian passes was already waiting for Suvorov. The two broken Russian armies, one wrecked by the French second battle of Zurich, the other frittered away in the Alps, were spent and returned home.

The French and Austrians learned the costly lesson of keeping military forces in Switzerland too: As the country is criss-crossed by mountains and rivers, it creates numerous mutually unsupported positions that have to be guarded by large numbers which are prone to be ambushed and defeated in detail. The lack of local agricultural resources requires costly logistics. Thus, it is cheaper for all not to invade Switzerland and acknowledge Swiss neutrality..

Best bio of Fred out there.

If you're at all interested in the subject, just read it already.

4622. Through German Eyes The British and the Somme 1916, by Christopher Duffy (read 28 Sep 2009) This is a 2006 book by a British, well, I guess, Irish, historian (his father was an Irish Guardsman in the Great War) telling of the battles of the Somme from July 1 till year's end in 1916. It tells the story based on German records, and especially on the information which captured Englishmen told their German captors--it seems the Germans got lots of valuable information from the loose-lipped English captives. Sometimes it is unclear what the author is describing: what Germans said, what captive English said, or general knowledge of the events. The loss of life was terrible but I agree that the Somme helped the Allies to win the war, even though it was more deadly for the British than for the Germans. There is a good discussion of weapons used in the battle, of gas, of tanks (first used in the battle), and of airplanes. The account of the battles (told in great detail) I found not interest-holding.½

As 1945 opened, the Third Reich was crumbling under crushing body blows from the east and west. The Soviets, who had spent three and a half years fighting the Germans on their own territory, had managed to push the German lines back to the Vistula River in Poland. By early January, the Soviet Army was preparing a massive assault from three bridgeheads on the west bank of the Vistula.

Winter was a favorable time for the Soviets to launch their offensive. The land west of the Vistula is flat, open farm land and the ground was frozen hard enough to bear the weight of T-34 tanks. In places, even the rivers were frozen deeply enough to bear the weight of trucks and other machinery. In a few more months, the spring thaw would arrive, the rivers would flow freely and the ground would become too soft to carry the weight of an army. When the weather warmed, the tanks and trucks would be forced to travel by road, funneled into tight corridors where they would lose the advantage of their maneuverability. Yes, winter favored the Russians.

In Red Storm on the Reich, Christopher Duffy provides an operational level history of the Russian campaign which saw the Red Army sweep victoriously from the Vistula to the Oder River, setting the stage for the final assault on Berlin. Arrayed against them was the remnants of the once mighty German army, now reduced to a shadow of its former glory, unable to hold back the rising tide from the east.

After several months of preparation, the Soviets were well prepared for their new offensive. Detailed maps of the German lines were prepared. Massive quantities of supplies had been moved up to ensure that troops would have sufficient supplies to fully exploit the breakthrough and penetrate deep into the German rear.

Unable to resist the Red Army across the entire front, Hitler's plan was to turn every major city into a fortress that would resist to the last man. It's difficult to shake the notion that, in Hitler's mind, each fortress city was meant to become the German equivalent of Stalingrad, a mighty wall on which the tide of the Russian military would break and shatter. But the desired effect was not to emerge. German forces were encircled and destroyed by Russian armies at the peak of their power and thirsting for vengeance.

The confident, and competent, Soviet Generals stand in sharp contrast to the strutting, political martinets now doing Hitler's bidding. Heinrich Himmler, an inexperienced and worthless General, is given command of the German army along the Oder River, but having no idea or interest in commanding troops, he spends his time with doctors tending to his cold and avoiding responsibility for defense.

At the Oder, the Russians are now positioned for a final attack on Berlin. However, before they can launch that final thrust, the pause to secure their flanks. In the north, the Russians turn right to crush Pomerania, in a brutal campaign. The local German Gauleiter refused to allow civilians to escape the approaching onslaught, so they are trapped in the midst of battle. When, too late, they attempt to evacuate by sea, the Soviets are unable to distinguish between fleeing civilians and escaping soldiers. The result is wholesale slaughter of innocent civilians held essentially as hostages by the Nazi government.

In contrast, in the south, the Soviets turn left to seize the rich industrial area of Upper Silesia. Thinking towards the future, Stalin declares the region "Gold" and wants it taken intact as the spoils of war. Here, the Soviets use a different tactic. Instead of simply encircling and reducing the region by direct assault, they threaten encirclement, but then deliberately fail to close the ring. Instead they apply pressure to the threatened German forces and allow them to escape through the remaining gap, leaving the industrial region relatively unharmed.

Duffy provides an excellent history of this penultimate moment in the destruction of Nazi Germany. The leadership of both sides are sketched with an acid pen. There are few honorable men at high levels on the Russo-German front. At times his personal distaste for some of the characters involved bleeds through a little too harshly, especially in the conclusion. All in all, this is an excellent reference for those interested in the history of WWII and Eastern Europe.

1816 The Wild Goose and the Eagle: A Life of Marshal von Browne 1705-1757, by Christopher Duffy (read 28 Nov 1983) Maximilien von Browne was born 23 Oct (or Dec) 1705 at Basle to Ulysses Browne and his wife Annabella Fitzgerald. Ulysses Browne left Ireland in 1690. Maximilien attained the highest rank in the Austrian Army, and died of wounds suffered in the battle of Prague on 6 May 1757--his death occurred on 25 June 1757. He was buried at the Capuchin Church in Prague "where it (his body) still rests under a monument of grey and red marble." This book tells a very adequate story of its subject's battles, but tells little about the man as a human being. It is a good book, and tells much of the War of the Austrian Succession, which began when Frederick the Great invaded Silesia and ended in 1748.½

Using original german documents that sum up interrogations of allied soldiers captured during the 1916 Somme offensive, Duffy has wrote a masterly book that will give the reader an interesting insight of this battle. I have read a number of books covering the Somme, and this is one of the better ones. A must have for the serious student of the Great War.

hardback

Warfare/History