Bruce Ackerman

The book is basically a long law review article about the takings clause of the constitution. It's also a good blend of political philosophy and the law.

The difficulty with these kinds of books is that I have no clue if the ideas are still relevant or if major case law has changed the playing field. I have yet to take take property, so the problems are compounded.

However, the good news about the book is that it is barely about property law. Ackerman is more interested in using the takings clause as an illustration of the two types of ideal legal philosophies and their implications. Ackerman argues that the struggle in the compensation clause is really a struggle between what he calls ordinary observers and scientific policymakers. Ordinary observers are those who wish to use ordinary non-technical language in order enforce dominant social expectations, while scientific policymakers want to use a highly developed technical language to conform the law to some master comprehensive principle, whether it is law and economic's efficiency, Bentham's utility or Kant's deontology (Ackerman sees Rawls as a promising way of transforming Kant from theoretical to applicable). Ackerman further draws distinctions between judges' willingness to defer to the other political branches and the judges' willingness to redistribute wealth. The ideal types are interesting, and Ackerman's explanation of the implications for each theoretical framework is illuminating.

Ackerman's main thesis is that takings clause is dominated by ordinary observer philosophy. According to Ackerman, the law tries to organize takings jurisprudence around common social understandings of property and takings rather than the legal meaning of property. Such an explanation drives why the takings clause will compensate someone who has their property explicitly taken or destroyed by the state by not when the value of their property is destroyed by regulation. However, Ackerman argues that this view has become incoherent over time, and is being challenged by scientific policymakers. Scientific policy makers wish to base takings jurisprudence on the legal understanding of property as bundles of legal rights, and conform the distribution of these rights to some master principle. Ackerman clearly, approves of the rise of scientific policy makers, but takes great lengths to explain the nuances of each position, their conflicts and areas of agreement.

Overall, the writing is very fluid, and it's fun seeing Ackerman apply utility, Kant and even Hegel to the law. It's clearly written by a lawyer, most of the book is probably disclaimer and qualifications! A good read overall, even if the law is not current.… (altro)

Segundo libro sobre la historia de la Constitución Américana y de sus modificaciones por fuera del sistema previsto por la misma, aquí analiza la revolución del New Deal y el switch in time de la Corte, como producto en definitiva de una reforma constitucional fáctica atento el voto mayoritario del pueblo a favor de Roosevelt. Cambio que no se da en una etapa sino que requiere una especie de instalación y curso, pero advierto el riesgo de una democracia plebicitaria y dependiente del humor de la masa… (altro)

Excelente libro, plantea la dinámica Constitucional como un juego de tensiones de dos momentos diferentes, en momentos de tranquilidad, o en momentos donde la sociedad se plantea algún cambio o pretende reforzar alguna idea, oportunidad ésta en la que el ciudadano debe según el autor ocuparse y preocuparse y tomar una participación más activa. en ese marco de doble juego es como hay que interpretar la constitución que inclusive es modificada via validación de la Corte de los nuevos pensamientos de la gente, así paso por ejemplo con el new deal, donde la SCOTUS comprendió lo que quería la gente e hizo el cambio a tiempo que evitó su aumento y paso a acompañar al gobierno de Roosevelt… (altro)