Based on documents disinterred by class-action suits brought against GM for the use of forced labor by its Opel subsidiary, Henry Turner projects the image of a firm that was more sinned against then sinner, as Opel's management can be shown to have consistently sought to keep Nazi political interference at arms-length, and when that failed to minimize participation in the German war effort until all control was essentially lost. Turner shows that Opel's biggest missteps were a 1938 proposal to make engine parts for the Luftwaffe, in a misguided effort to make powerful friends, and the decision to accept Opel's depreciated wartime profits (a little more than $260,000 in 1951 money); the second opening GM up to accusations of wartime culpability. As dubious as these moves appear in retrospect, they are far from the accusations of full-fledged participation by GM in the German war effort made by critics.

As for the notion that GM should have simply divested itself of its troublesome subsidiary, Turner finds this notion to be unrealistic. Opel was too profitable to be disposed of at a time when German-American relations were nominally friendly. Currency controls existing in Germany meant that there were virtually no options for a sale that would have been worthwhile for GM. Finally, the upper management of GM of the period cultivated an apolitical attitude towards the foreign governments it had to deal with as a matter of policy, until the culmination point of war. Sometimes you really do have no good options. ( )