Got this out from the USyd library on Gregory Chaitin's (see above [no wonder, it references and praises his work]) recommendation.

Although I couldn't say that I'm down with everything that came at me from this book, I'm going to say that this seems to be a really nice little book which cuts through a lot of confusion and places its arguments in (mostly convincing) historical context. Definitely worth a cementing second run through.

On a superficial note, it was great to have the likes Poincare, Hilbert, Weyl, Turing, von Neumann and Godel discussed alongside the likes of Heidegger, Wittengestein and Derrida without feeling like the discussion is a whole bunch of bullshit (notice how my memory for name dropping mathematicians trumps that of my ability for philosphers). Although I feel like Tasic unnecessarily mixes up terminology (signifiers) [that's the whole point! I hear someone scream], his anologies between math and epistemology are often rather good. Like comparing the (mathematical) continuum or the definition of Euclidean geometry via continuous transformations (IYI: the orthogonal group) or (in a grander sense) Hilbert's failed attempt at total formalism and attempting to pin down meaning in a sea of signifiers fighting to be, mutating into, and failing to be signifieds is pretty well spot on in terms of YES THAT IS A MEANINGFUL ANALOGY AND IT ACTUALLY ILLUMINATES THE POINT.

On a fun note, there are two super cool things in the book. About 1/3 of the way in Tasic asked what we would think if the book suddenly ended there and then and why we don't think this is going to happen because we are projecting our expectations (he used different terminiolgy) as to what arguments and how much discussion is to come. I really liked this, but almost proclaimed outloud "I know it's not going to end here because I'm holding the book in my hands and there are more pages to come FUCK STICK". It would be great to really end a text like that. Maybe by filling the rest with random nonsense. (He stole this idea off someone else, can't remember who.)

The second fun note: he includes Berry's paradox (which I've seen before but these things are fun forever):

The least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables.

When you work out what it is, check the definition again.

On a critical note, more and more I'm thinking that any book that tries to tackle meaning and epistemology is doomed doomed doomed without a healthy dose of Darwinism and this book fails utterly miserably on that count. (See Dennett's "Darwin's Dangerous Idea" for a prime example of getting it right.)