As the first book I have ever read on the conflicts in the South Caucasus (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh”), I had high expectations for this book. Using the New Haven School of Law (NHS), the author attempts to offer a legal analysis of the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh’s secession from Azerbaijan.

Unfortunately, I found this book lacking in analysis, and sometimes seemed like it was an attempt to rationalize U.S.-led Western imperialism than objectively analyze the legality of these conflicts.

The book can be divided into these two sections: 1.) An analysis of the right to self-determination, including secession, under international law; 2.) why Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh do not have the right to secession but Kosovo does.

All the reasons the author lists as to how Kosovo is ‘different’ from Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh are dubious if not outright false.

1.) “There is a possibility of Western countries’ not recognizing Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Prednestrovie, and Nagorno Karabakh because of gravitation of the latter entities toward Russia, almost depending on it. Which you cannot say about Kosovo which pro-Western authorities positioned themselves from the beginning as supporters of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures” (p. 168).

In other words, the U.S. and its allies don’t recognize Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Prednestrovie, and Nagorno-Karabakh because they are dependent on Russia and not the U.S.?

2.) “We should also pay attention to the arguments of the secession demands of Kosovo on the one hand, and the separatist movements in the post-Soviet space, on the other. The only argument in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Prednestrovie, and Nagorno Karabakh was, and still is, a reference to the right of the people to self-determination.” The author contrasts this to how the “main emphasis of Kosovars was on human rights, democratic elections, and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures” (p. 168).

Now the author seems to be substituting an objective legal analysis for his own subjective feelings, based on his own ideology, as to the claims used by these various entities for secession. The main emphasis of Kosovars was on “human rights” – what and who’s human rights? – “democratic elections” – that’s a catch phrase for ‘unhindered capitalist development in alliance with U.S.-led Western imperialism’, as democratic elections mean absolutely nothing outside the socio-economic context in which they occur, as demonstrated by U.S.-led Western imperialism’s ongoing coup attempt in Venezuela – “and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures” – meaning a desire to be subordinated to U.S.-led Western imperialism. None of these are legal arguments.

3.) “The ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was done by Serbia (mother country), not Albania. In Karabakh, it was done by Armenia, not Azerbaijan. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia, not Georgia” (p. 168).

This is outright false.

First, in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, there was inter-ethnic violence; it was far from being one-sided. In Azerbaijan, two notable anti-Armenian pogroms include the 1988 Sumgait pogrom, in which anywhere from 30 to 200+ Armenians were massacred, the largest anti-Armenian massacre since the 1915 genocide, and the Baku pogrom in 1990, in which 90+ Armenians were murdered in Azerbaijan’s capital.

Secondly, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) itself committed acts of ethnic cleansing of Serbs in Kosovo. This organization, which, according to the author, was fighting for “human rights” and “democratic elections”, has been linked to numerous crimes, including: mass expulsions and displacement of ethnic Serbs, both during and after the war (as early as 1999, some 170,000 of Kosovo’s pre-war population of 200,000 Serbs had been expelled or fled to Serbia), the use of child soldiers to fight for the KLA, the use of KLA-controlled concentration and torture camps, the destruction of over 100 Serbian churches, and even the harvesting of organs from Serbs.

Nowhere have I read of concentration camps, organ harvesting, etc., with regards to Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, by either the secessionists or by their supporters (Russia, Armenia).

To claim that Kosovo is unique from Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh because of ethnic cleansing is dubious, as Kosovars were both the victims and the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing, is dubious, and that Kosovars emphasize human rights and democratic elections is patently false.

Despite these obvious shortcomings, the value of this book, for me anyway, is less about what information it contains as to the questions it asks (or led me to ask).

Reading this book has left me with a lot of questions as to how Marxists should respond to unilateral declarations of independence of ethnic minorities, whether in socialist or capitalist states.

Do Marxists recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Kosovo, etc.?

Stalin wrote that “A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.”

Do all such ‘nations’ have the right to secession/independence?

If so, how do Marxists reconcile the right to secession/independence of such ‘nations’ with the territorial integrity of the State? Surely, no Marxist would accept the Balkanization of a multi-ethnic state, such as the Soviet Union, along ethnic lines.

If not, when do Marxists recognize the secession/independence of a ‘nation’? What criteria is used? No Marxist, that I know, would seriously contest the independence of, say, Bangladesh, which seceded from Pakistan in 1971, for example. Likewise, I can’t think of too many Marxists that would contest Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993. Why do Marxists recognize Eritrea and Bangladesh but not NKR, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, etc.? ( )