This book is an extended discussion and critique of Heidegger. While he acknowledges many of Heidegger's insights and is in agreement on a number of matters, Rosen contends that his central claims about the history of philosophy and metaphysics in general, and its birth and death in Plato and Nietzsche in particular, involve serious misinterpretations and confusions. Moreover, Rosen considers Heidegger's philosophy of Being to be essentially vacuous, having at best no effect on our grasp of beings and at worst promulgating a sort of "European Buddhism," as Nietzsche puts it, in which we end up involved in absurd theoretical posturing over the event of Being which is nothing: perversely, "The more we meditate on Being, the less we see of beings" (Rosen 314).

While it would be inaccurate to say that Rosen attempts to mount a defense of Platonism against the onslaught of Heidegger's critique of the metaphysics of presence, Rosen persuasively argues that Heidegger's Plato is distorted beyond recognition by the being read through Aristotle. Where Heidegger sees Aristotle as having deepened Plato's thought (though also taken us further astride from the grasp of Being articulated by the pre-Socratic philosophers), Rosen sees the two thinkers as quite different, and indeed holds that certain deep problems of Aristotle's ontology and theory of perception point (back) to Platonic solutions. In any case, if we are to buy into Heidegger's reading of the history of philosophy as that of the metaphysics of presence, Rosen suggests that this history is one of Aristotelianism, not Platonism. Rosen comes across for the most part as a sophisticate and nuanced interpreter of Plato, though even he seems too willing at some points to take Socrates at his word, and unproblematically treat him as Plato's mouthpiece.

Rosen similarly spends a good deal of time arguing against Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche. The crux of Rosen's point here, if I read him correctly, is that Nietzsche's two doctrines of the Will to Power and the Eternal Return must, *pace* Heidegger, be read as incompatible and (respectively) exoteric and esoteric claims---not of a metaphysical nature, but of a practico-productive nature, i.e., claims about how to live, and what is best for life. Contrary to Heidegger's attempt to read an inner law in Chaos, and hence to Heidegerreanize (and rationalize, says Rosen) Nietzsche, chaos has no inner law, no structure. Man as will to power is simply a random output of what is at heart chaos and unreason. This is clearly incompatible with Nietzsche's product of inaugurating a new type of human, and of ranking types and attitudes, insofar as these all rely on the reality of a will to power that can be heightened or lessened, this (ultimate) reality being precisely what is denied by the metaphysics of chaos. Heidegger's main error with regard to Nietzsche is in foisting a reconciliation onto these irreconcilable positions.

The Question of Being is engaging, stimulating, and often very persuasive. Yet Rosen's too-frequent derisions of Heidegger's "bad poetry" get a bit tiring, and he occasionally moves far too quickly through what should be slow, careful argumentation (e.g. when discussing the criteria for an adequate theory of perception. Though a largely generous commentator, he also sometimes gets lazy and dismissive, which is unfortunately when he tends to issue his most trenchant and interesting criticisms of Heidegger.

Without at least a basic familiarity with Plato, Aristotle, Nietzsche, and Husserl (obviously Heidegger as well), and ideally a more advanced understanding of at least some of these figures, you'll have a hard time getting much out of this book. ( )