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Sto caricando le informazioni... Battle for Cassinga : South Africa's controversial cross-border raid, Angola 1978di Mike McWilliams
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Appartiene alle SerieAfrica@War (37)
Battle for Cassinga is written as a firsthand account by an ordinary South African paratrooper who was at the 1978 assault on the Angolan headquarters of PLAN, the armed wing of SWAPO. The book relates why the South African government took the political risk in attacking the fortress in an external operation and examines the SWAPO claims that Cassinga was a refugee camp guarded by a few PLAN soldiers. It also explains why Sam Nujoma the SWAPO leader had no option but to perpetuate this falsehood. The battle, although a resounding success, suffered some setbacks which could have been disastrous to the South African paratroopers had they not maintained the initiative. The improvisations made by the commander Col Jan Breytenbach ensured that a flawed jump and poor intelligence did not adversely affect the outcome. The unforeseen Soviet-made anti-aircraft guns used against both aircraft and ground troops threatened to derail the attack. An appearance of a large column of armor manned by Cubans from the nearby town of Techamutete, when half the South African force had already left the battleground, placed the remaining lightly armed paratroopers in mortal danger. The landmines laid by the South Africans, together with the brave actions of the South African Air Force pilots saved the day, allowing the remaining forces to withdraw safely. Battle for Cassinga looks at all the players in a critical light. SWAPO and PLAN, the SADF and the commanders from both sides, Dimo Amaambo of PLAN and Jan Breytenbach of the SADF as well as the brave soldiers from both sides who fought for their political ideologies but perhaps, more importantly, for their own band of brothers. Non sono state trovate descrizioni di biblioteche |
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Google Books — Sto caricando le informazioni... GeneriSistema Decimale Melvil (DDC)967.3History and Geography Africa Central Africa AngolaClassificazione LCVotoMedia:
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Author Scholtz describes himself in the preface as a professional historian, but seems to have spent most of his career as a journalist. He served in both the pre- and post-[i]apartheid[/i] South African military. This book was published in 2016 about events that occurred in 1987 and 1988.
A chapter on background notes the roots of the conflict; South Africa accepted the independence of Angola (although I imagine without a lot of enthusiasm) but didn’t want things to spill over into Southwest Africa (now Namibia). The South Africa supported UINTA inside Angola and allowed it “safe havens” across the Southwest Africa border; the Soviets and their Cuban proxy supported the Angolan government and its military arm, the FAPLA. In 1987, the FAPLA undertook an offensive against UINTA and South Africa sent troops to UINTA’s support combat occurred in the area west of the town of Cuito Cuanavale.
Scholtz makes it clear that this was not a counterinsurgency operation against guerilla forces; the FAPLA may have been guerillas when they were fighting the Portuguese but now they (and the Cubans) were a conventional mechanized army equipped with T-55 tanks, BTR-60 infantry vehicles, and MiG-21 and -23 aircraft. The Angolans had air superiority - due to air base locations and superior aircraft; a shorter logistical chain; and massive resupply from the USSR.
However – even though Scholtz is biased in favor of the South Africans – it’s pretty clear that they had tactical and operational superiority. The book is abundantly illustrated with pictures of destroyed and captured Angolan equipment, and UINTA maintained its presence along the Southwest African border. Both sides claimed victory, of course, with the Angolan/Cubans announcing that Cuito Cuanavale was an “African Stalingrad” for the South Africans. Scholtz dismisses this as “drivel”, with South Africa taking very light equipment and personnel loses. In fact Scholtz is pretty hard on all the governments involved, with pre-independence Portugal a “fascist dictatorship”, Angola a Marxist dictatorship, Fidel Castro a “brutal dictator” and the South African government militarily naïve in not committing enough troops to achieve a decisive victory.
Good maps of the various battles. Abundant color illustrations – although none of the actual fighting; they mostly show South Africans or UINTA troops standing around destroyed or captured Angolan vehicles. A short bibliography. I’ve already mentioned the misbound cover. Worth reading as an account of a Cold War conflict that I expect everybody involved would like to forget. ( )