Over the course of the twentieth century, the Republican Party evolved from an ideologically diverse coalition of regional groups into a more uniformly conservative organization. There were many steps in this process, from the split created by Theodore Roosevelt’s presidential run in 1912 to the struggle between the so-called “Rockefeller” and “Goldwater” Republicans in the 1960s, which have received attention from scholars. In this book Michael Bowen focuses another step in this transformation, the battle between the supporters of Thomas E. Dewey and Robert Taft in the 1940s and early 1950s. In the process, he corrects several misconceptions about the nature of their conflict, corrections that shed considerable light on the modern-day struggles within the GOP today.

Bowen begins with the Republican Party in the early 1940s, when it faced successive losses to the Democrats in the 1940 and 1944 presidential elections. Though defeated by Franklin Roosevelt in 1944, Dewey used his role as the Republican nominee to install his people in key positions within the party. With their help Dewey sought to project a more moderate image for the GOP, one that might be more appealing to the broader electorate. This goal, however, put Dewey at odds with Taft, who projected a more conservative tone and sought to capture the presidential nomination for himself. Yet Bowen sees their clash as more a matter of ambition and style rather than substance, noting both Dewey’s conservative positions and Taft’s moderate stance on a few prominent subjects. Yet what ultimately proved the determining factor was organization, something which Dewey’s aides (most notably Herbert Brownell) proved far superior at than their pro-Taft’s forces, as was ultimately demonstrated by their success in ensuring Dwight Eisenhower’s nomination as the Republican presidential candidate in 1952.

Detailed and insightful, Bowen’s book offers a detailed look at a key period in the history of the Republican Party. The product of extensive research in several archives, it illuminates the backroom maneuvering that was no less significant for happening behind the scenes. Yet the book is plagued by a number of troubling factual errors (Joseph Martin, for example, was minority leader in the House of Representatives in 1944, not majority leader; Taft was first elected to the Senate in 1938 rather than 1936, and Christian Herter was a Congressman in 1950, not governor of Massachusetts) that, while minor in and of themselves, collectively raise doubts about some of his interpretations of events. Yet these errors don’t completely detract from the effort Bowen has made in shedding light on a party struggle that helped to define the GOP as we understand it today. ( )