William Stuart Nance

This monograph is very much a piece of advocacy by a career mechanized officer, as Nance explains how the specialized corps-level cavalry units of the U.S. Army in the ETO over-achieved their nominal mission and were far more than specialized reconnaissance elements. That this was often in disregard with the official operational doctrine that had started to coalesce with the formation of the U.S. armored divisions and more akin to the traditional roles of cavalry in the U.S. military is one of the ironies here. I was certainly happy to read this book as I always had the sense that there was a story to be told here that had generally gotten swept under the carpet. However, this work does presume you've done a fair amount of previous reading, otherwise you'll be confused when you're expected to know the big picture of events. My favorite example is the reference to General John Millikin commanding III Corps at Remagen Bridgehead on one page and three pages later there will be a reference to General James Van Fleet's III Corps resuming the offensive, where it will be presumed that you're aware of Millikin's relief from command having due to having lost the confidence of Courtney Hodge, the commander of U.S. 1st Army. The alternative for the reader would be Gordon Rottman's booklet for Osprey on the subject, but that deals more in terms of Table of Organization & Equipment matters and tactics; both works make more sense in conjunction with each other.… (altro)