The emergence of modern states in Europe has been discussed from numerous angles by historians, so I hesitated a bit before buying this book. I suspected that it might be just another recapitulation of familiar models, lacking originality. But to my surprise this turned out to be the most explanatory work I've read on state development and it greatly increased my understanding of the subject.

The author's model is simple. In the concluding chapter he summarizes it as follows:

- The kind of political regime which a given state came to possess by the 18th century was determined by the ability of national representative assemblies to resist royal pressures for absolutism, which was in turn a function of the nature of local government (p.317).
- The kind of state apparatus which emerged in a given European polity in response to geomilitary competition was determined in the first instance by the conditions under which such apparatuses were first constructed. (p.318)

These components lead to a fourfold classification where two kinds of political regimes; absolutist and constitutional, mix with two kinds of state apparatus; patrimonial and bureaucratic. The author discusses at great length examples from each of the four categories: France and Spain (absolutist and patrimonial), Poland and Hungary (constitutional and patrimonial), Denmark and the German states (absolutist and bureaucratic) plus Britain and Sweden (constitutional and bureaucratic).

The framework parsimoniously accounts for variations in two key components of state administration: effective taxation and military mobilization. Constitutional regimes held broader legitimacy and could tax the general population with greater latitude than absolutist ones. On the other hand, the scope of political action in constitutional regimes was more limited than in absolutist ones due to the differing opinions that local representation embodied.

States that faced military competition before developing impersonal administration relied on patrimony. In patrimonial states political and military posts were sold, owned and inherited, which led to disunity and inflexibility in both financial and military matters. Bureaucratic states had had the time to develop a malleable civil service before facing existential military threats. They could therefore administer their finances and maintain a united military force with greater ease than patrimonial ones.

All of this amounts to a fascinating historical analysis of political compromise, participation and logrolling in European monarchies from the middle ages to the 18th century. Herein lies the unique value of this book: it shows that modern conceptions such as local participatory government had practical counterparts and consequences a long time before democracy in the modern sense came to be. The balancing of self-interest with general interest is not a recent political phenomenon. It was present in early political organizations and this book offers a very useful starting point for understanding its historical manifestations.