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Sto caricando le informazioni... Vicksburg: The Campaign That Opened the Mississippidi Michael B. Ballard
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Appartiene alle SerieCivil War America (2004)
Risorse esterne che parlano di questo libro Wikipedia in inglese (12)Michael Ballard provides a concise yet thorough study of the 1863 battle that cut off a crucial river port and rail depot for the South and split the Confederate nation, providing a turning point in the Civil War. The Union victory at Vicksburg was hailed with as much celebration in the North as the Gettysburg victory and Ballard makes a convincing case that it was equally important to the ultimate resolution of the conflict. Non sono state trovate descrizioni di biblioteche |
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Google Books — Sto caricando le informazioni... GeneriSistema Decimale Melvil (DDC)973.7History and Geography North America United States Administration of Abraham Lincoln, 1861-1865 Civil WarClassificazione LCVotoMedia:
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However, I do have some problems with this book as a military narrative, and I should have been tipped off from the start when Ballard speaks of treating both the tactical and strategic levels of the campaign. Seeing as you're writing about a campaign as an integrated whole, why not write about it from the operational perspective? I'm not even sure that Ballard is aware that there is such a level of analysis.
What also gives me pause are scattered anecdotes about friction in the Confederate command structure, as Pemberton is torn between Pres. Davis' insistence on holding Vicksburg for its own sake and Joe Johnston's desire to trade space for time and concentrate his forces. Ballard goes out of his way to excoriate Johnston, describing him as "a general who would not fight;" which seems just a tad unfair to me. Later, Ballard goes so far as to suggest that Robert E. Lee mounted his 1863 Pennsylvania campaign so as to avoid sending troops to the western theater of the war; with no analysis to back up this claim. The irony here is that Ballard winds up grudgingly admitting that Johnston was right in his operational concept! This all suggests to me that Ballard takes this campaign more than a little personally (the author hails from Mississippi), and also appears to be in thrall to the revisionists of a generation ago, such as Connelly and Nolan. This represents a pitfall to the student of the war who is relatively new to the field. ( )