A slim but wide-ranging introduction to warfare in the Mughal empire. The first several first several chapters deal with things like the ecological constraints on warfare in India, martial ideology, and recruitment; this is followed by more traditional mil-hist sections about weapons, tactics, and narrative accounts of a few individual campaigns (the conquest of Bengal in the early 17th century, the failed campaigns in northern Afghanistan in the middle of the century, and the siege of Gingee in southern India towards its end).

A recurring theme is that the Mughals generally prefered to co-opt rather than destroy their enemies. While they resorted to blunt force often enough, large chunks of India were effectively bought by giving local grandees positions (and salaries) in the Mughal hierarchy. Another is the continuing predominance of cavalry and that European developments in gunpowder warfare and fortification had limited impact before the 18th century; Gommans rejects the idea that the Mughals' was a "gunpowder empire".