Generally a very good introduction, slightly disappointed in the fragmentary content at the end of the book about abnormal states if consciousness. ( )

Great quick review of various definitions and theories of consciousness. Author came on a little strongly with her own views in the last few pages, but I happen to more or less agree with them. Would like to read a “not-quite-so-short” introduction with about the same style and level of difficulty but more in depth… ( )

Early on, the author sets out the problem. Is consciousness something extra we have, over and above the physical world, or is it intrinsically a phenomenon of the physical world? If the former, then we’re entitled to ask (a) how consciousness and world interact with one another, (b) what, if anything, consciousness does, (c) where it comes from, how we get it, and (d) are we special, or do other animals have it too? But if it’s the latter, such questions look less formidable; what is, though, now a huge problem instead is to explain why we still seem to have this non-physical, purely mental, entity inside our heads. In a nutshell: if there are two realms, how can they ever influence one another; if there is only one, why does it seem as if there are two?
    So what about studying the brain, does that help? It certainly does, particularly since the advent of things like fMRI- and PET-scanning, but only up to a point. One of the main features of consciousness is its apparent unity, both in time and space: it seems to have continuity, from moment to moment, and is experienced as a phenomenon here, i.e. “me”. But the brain is pretty much the opposite of all that—decentralised, massively parallel, a network of networks.
    Nevertheless there are, and have always been, no end of theories about mind and world, from dualists blithely waving away the “how could they ever influence one another” problem (“…details, details…”), to today’s quantum-theory enthusiasts “explaining” one age-old enigma with a modern one.
    Susan Blackmore deals with all this, and much more besides—and has her own views on the subject, as we all do, which does give the book a bit of a slant. But for an introduction to this subject it’s exceptionally well written, the language as plain as you could ask for. And if you are in any doubt yourself about consciousness, “the self” and so on, my favourite idea (pps 74-5) might help clarify things: picture a teleporter, the sort of matter-transmitter imagined by science-fiction writers. It looks like a phone booth, you step in at this end, the booth makes a recording of you—every last cell, every atom of every cell—then destroys you and transmits the recording to a second booth on the other side of the world, where you (is it you?) step back out. The journey is free, won’t cost you a penny. And while in real life nothing is ever completely infallible, for the sake of this thought-experiment assume our teleporter is absolutely, guaranteed, one hundred per cent safe. The question, of course, is: would you go? ( )

Blackmore does a great job condensing this vast subject and making it understandable by those not in the field of philosophy or brain science. While some of the philosophy and theological discussion is interesting (I did not know the philosophical origins of "zombie," for example), I found the brain science stuff intriguing. She covers all the notable brain experiments over time that were related to human consciousness. Fascinating stuff. She ends with a chapter on altered states, which includes drug trips and hypnosis. This is an excellent introduction to the subject for those of us who may not be up for a longer, more extensive exploration of the subject, but also could be a doorway for some into further studies. ( )

It is difficult, as a philosopher, to review the work of another philosopher without taking issue with conclusions with which one disagrees. However, it is easy to recognize a work that strives to be fair to all perspectives, providing both positive and negative assessments of the various explanations for the concept of "consciousness." This much Blackmore does very well, although she does overlook some very important theories of that to which the "I" refers (but then, this is supposed to be a very short introduction, so some omissions are inevitable).

Blackmore ultimately turns to the "eliminative materialist" position, according to which self-consciousness is a self-deception, and ought to be dismissed as such. This may not be very satisfactory to many, but she does give a discussion overall that is adequate to show why some philosophers have become eliminativist, if only out of frustration.

A nice, concise, introduction to a very deep issue. (I read the Kindle version of this book.) ( )