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The rapid evolution of radio and radar systems for military use during the Second World War, and devices to counter them, led to a technological battle that neither the Axis nor the Allied powers could afford to lose. The result was a continual series of thrusts, parries and counter-thrusts, as first one side then the other sought to wrest the initiative in the struggle to control the ether. This was a battle fought with strange-sounding weapons: 'Freya', 'Mandrel', 'Boozer' and 'Window'; and was characterised by the bravery, self-sacrifice and skill of those who took part in it. However, for many years the use of electronic-warfare systems during the conflict remained a closely guarded military secret. When that veil of secrecy was finally lifted, the technicalities of the subject meant that it remained beyond the reach of lay researchers and readers. Alfred Price, an aircrew officer with the RAF where he flew with V-Force and specialised in electronic warfare and air fighting tactics, was in the unique position to lift the lid on this largely unexplored aspect of the Second World War. When it was first published in 1967, Instruments of Darkness came to be regarded as a standard reference work on this intriguing subject. This completely revised edition concludes with the Japanese surrender in August 1945 and brings the analysis fully up to date in the light of what we now know. 'This book is expertly done. An excellent treatise.' The Times Literary Supplement… (altro)
I have to admit it; I'm a tech-freak. I love to read about the technical aspect of military aviation, weapon systems, avionics, aerodynamics and stuff like that.
No victory in electronic warfare during WWI was lasting or absolute. Sooner or later your move would be followed by a countermove by the enemy. Thus the scientist had to stay at least one jump ahead at all times. The mapping of the enemy's technical and production capacity through electronic and other intelligence was essential. And every piece of intelligence had to be painstakingly put together in order to create an overall picture as clear possible.
And when to deploy new devises also had to be taken into consideration. Do we have a countermeasure to our own countermeasures? Like the 'Windows/Chaff' which was held back for some months as it was feared that the Germans had an equivalent - Düppel - in production. And if the Germans could see how efficient Windows/Chaff was they would begin air attacks on the UK using Düppel leaving the British radars blinded and British and Americans with no means to counter it.
Pure luck also played a part as when a JU-88 night fighter pilot lost his way and landed on an air base in the UK giving the scientist invaluable knowledge served undamaged at the end of the runway with so little fuel in the tanks that it was not even enough to make a fuel analysis.
I find this book as intriguing as any crime or spy novel. Easy to read and informative on a level where even I can follow. And as Dr. Alfred Price is one of my favorite authors I really had a good time reading it.
So if this subject has your interest, go get the book, find a good chair, sit down an submerge
By the way, I found this quotation as introduction to the last chapter in the book which I believe covers many things during war times:
"To inquire if and where we made mistakes is not to apologize. War is replete with mistakes because it is full of improvisations. In war we are always doing something for the first time. It would be a miracle if what we improvised under the stress of war should be perfect"
Very interesting book on electronic warfare in WWII. Originally written in 1967, it was updated in 2005 to incorporate some new information. Gives a very good sense of the constant escalation of technology that takes place once high-tech electronics bec
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The instruments of darkness tell us truths, Win us with honest trifles, to betray's In deepest consequence. Macbeth
Dedica
Incipit
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The truth about Intelligence work in war is that much of its success depends on chance, and much upon tenacity; and little of it is glamorous in the way that readers of modern espionage thrillers would believe.
Citazioni
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One evening in December 1939, The German pocket battleship Graf Spee was scuttled in international waters in the estuary of the River Plate, off Montevideo. Five days before, she had suffered several hits in a battle with three British cruisers and her captain thought it unlikely that she would be able to fight her way back to a friendly port. But the River Plate has a shallow estuary, and when the demolition charges blew the ship’s bottom out, she sank only ten feet before coming to rest on the sea bed. At first light next morning, a fleet of small sightseeing boats put out from Montevideo to look at the shattered warship, which was still on fire. Scores of photographs were taken of the wreck, and the pictures wre flashed round the world by news agencies. Most people failed to notice one strange feature on the dramatic close-up photographs of the blazing hulk: an aerial-array looking rather like a bedstead on its side was mounted above the battleship’s bridge. British Intelligence sent its own sightseer, to look at the battleship on their behalf: Mr. L. Bainbridge Bell, a radar expert, arrived in Montevideo soon after. He boarded the wreck and climbed up to the aerial-array – a feat requiring some agility since the battleship had developed an uncomfortable list. Bell reported to London that the strange aerials almost certainly belonged to a radar set, probably for ranging in the ship’s guns. Armed with this information, naval Intelligence officers in London examined the file of photographs of Graff Spee, and they observed that the same structure was present, though hidden under close-fitting canvas covers, on photographs taken as early as 1938. This was a discomfiting discovery, since the Royal Navy had no gun-ranging radar, and would not receive its first set until 1941. However, Bainbridge Bell’s report was pigeon-holed, and the scientific Intelligence section of the Air Ministry did not hear of it until another eighteen months had passed.
Ultime parole
Dati dalle informazioni generali inglesi.Modifica per tradurlo nella tua lingua.
The resultant guarantee of survival is not a firm one, but it is the best today's bomber crewman is likely to get.
The rapid evolution of radio and radar systems for military use during the Second World War, and devices to counter them, led to a technological battle that neither the Axis nor the Allied powers could afford to lose. The result was a continual series of thrusts, parries and counter-thrusts, as first one side then the other sought to wrest the initiative in the struggle to control the ether. This was a battle fought with strange-sounding weapons: 'Freya', 'Mandrel', 'Boozer' and 'Window'; and was characterised by the bravery, self-sacrifice and skill of those who took part in it. However, for many years the use of electronic-warfare systems during the conflict remained a closely guarded military secret. When that veil of secrecy was finally lifted, the technicalities of the subject meant that it remained beyond the reach of lay researchers and readers. Alfred Price, an aircrew officer with the RAF where he flew with V-Force and specialised in electronic warfare and air fighting tactics, was in the unique position to lift the lid on this largely unexplored aspect of the Second World War. When it was first published in 1967, Instruments of Darkness came to be regarded as a standard reference work on this intriguing subject. This completely revised edition concludes with the Japanese surrender in August 1945 and brings the analysis fully up to date in the light of what we now know. 'This book is expertly done. An excellent treatise.' The Times Literary Supplement
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(4.29)
2
No victory in electronic warfare during WWI was lasting or absolute. Sooner or later your move would be followed by a countermove by the enemy. Thus the scientist had to stay at least one jump ahead at all times. The mapping of the enemy's technical and production capacity through electronic and other intelligence was essential. And every piece of intelligence had to be painstakingly put together in order to create an overall picture as clear possible.
And when to deploy new devises also had to be taken into consideration. Do we have a countermeasure to our own countermeasures? Like the 'Windows/Chaff' which was held back for some months as it was feared that the Germans had an equivalent - Düppel - in production. And if the Germans could see how efficient Windows/Chaff was they would begin air attacks on the UK using Düppel leaving the British radars blinded and British and Americans with no means to counter it.
Pure luck also played a part as when a JU-88 night fighter pilot lost his way and landed on an air base in the UK giving the scientist invaluable knowledge served undamaged at the end of the runway with so little fuel in the tanks that it was not even enough to make a fuel analysis.
I find this book as intriguing as any crime or spy novel. Easy to read and informative on a level where even I can follow. And as Dr. Alfred Price is one of my favorite authors I really had a good time reading it.
So if this subject has your interest, go get the book, find a good chair, sit down an submerge
By the way, I found this quotation as introduction to the last chapter in the book which I believe covers many things during war times:
"To inquire if and where we made mistakes is not to apologize. War is replete with mistakes because it is full of improvisations. In war we are always doing something for the first time. It would be a miracle if what we improvised under the stress of war should be perfect"
Vice-Admiral Hyman Rickover
Take care
J (