Great book in a lot of ways, broader in scope but similar to Pinker's "Better Angels..." book from a couple years ago. My main quibbles would be his lightweight treatment of philosophy, particularly in dealing with morality and the place of science in the world. But overall it's a fine counterweight to gloom-and-doom mongering - it's nice to see the many ways in which life has been getting better for most people most of the time around the world.
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Shermer's book was thought provoking over a wide variety of topics including: religion, philosophy, morals, law, science, government etc. I was not able to get through all 440 pages but picked and choosed topics and sections of the book that interested me.

Quotes from book:

In The Moral Arc my aim is to show that the Reverends Parker and King were right – – that the arc of the moral universe does indeed bend towards justice.

Most of the moral development of the past several centuries has been the result of secular not religious forces, and that the most important of these that emerged from the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment are science and reason…

"The strength of a civilization is not measured by its ability to fight wars, but rather by its ability to prevent them." Gene Roddenberry

The book (Bible) considered by more than 2 billion people to be the greatest moral guide ever produced – – inspired as it was by an all-knowing totally benevolent deity – – recommends the death penalty for saying the Lord's name at the wrong moment or in the wrong context, for imaginary crimes such as witchcraft, for commonplace sexual relations (adultery, fornication, homosexuality) and for the especially heinous crime of not resting on the Sabbath. ( )

Although I agree with much of what Shermer says, I found many flaws in his arguments. Still, this is a fascinating book to read, if a frustrating one. ( )

Overall an enjoyable and informative book, although Shermer has some obvious biases and some pet ideas that sometimes seem to blind him to other perspectives. Je appears to lean toward the new atheist position and views of Dawkins and Hitchins and generally blames religion for holding back the moral development of mankind. Although he does make some good points about how religion has balked at certain areas of moral progress, such as in the abolition of slavery and the recognition of LGBTQ rights, which found the church dragging its feet, he obviously is not well trained on theology. Like Dawkins he makes the Old Testament seem ludicrous, totally ignoring the cultural context of the morals on display there.

Shermer does make good arguments for the gradual advancement of morality in society over time and he does nicely show how democracy and political freedom seem to bolster moral progress. Where I think he lags is in his understanding and interpretation of poverty and economic inequality. He seems to downplay the negative consequences of economic inequality and I sense a very naive view of how corporations function and how they might reform themselves. I am much more pessimistic when it comes to moral progress in the economic arena.

Lastly, his "predictions" for the future are especially over the top. I really very much doubt that we will ever attain the technological and economic equality he describes in an almost Star Trek-like future where all our needs are met routinely. Given the current direction or technology progress has taken, we are more likely to destroy the planet than to improve it and improve the lives of humanity in general. It';s nice to dream, but I think we are far more likely to trigger a more apocalyptic future than a "protopian" one has Shermer envisions. ( )

Shermer wants to argue that "morality" is a thing of which there is only one, that it can be objectively ascertained, and (conveniently) that he possesses the ability to judge what that one true morality is. More than that, this one true morality matches perfectly everything he already believes. That should be the first red flag that what Shermer talks about bears no resemblance to "morality." A true deep dive into the contours of moral thinking should leave the author feeling as challenged and inadequate as the reader. No such introspection here. Shermer, perhaps ironically, has found true religion (or not ironically: he goes so far as to compose his own Ten Commandments), and he speaks with all the zeal of the smug prophet.

Painting in such bold strokes is an odd strategy given that he also argues that black/white conceptualizing is inferior to viewing situations with more nuance and gradations. He would have been well advised to follow his own counsel. The real world is not as simplistic as he wants to believe, but his text does provide a good example of the kind of self-serving philosophical justifying that Westerners enjoy when rationalizing their blunderings across the world stage. They can do it because they are more "moral" (as Shermer has defined the term) than anyone who opposes them.

A hallmark of this ethical myopia is that, for Shermer, the unqualified unit of moral agency is the (Western) independent individual. This is not an unusual position, to be sure, but Shermer appears to believe that it is a self-evident claim that warrants no defense or consideration of alternative views, or how this posture complicates (or rather, should complicate) his account. For example, something is right or wrong according to the way in which it impacts the survival and flourishing of the individual. However, flourishing is defined in such a way that it necessarily includes "bonding and social relations," so that the individual, in fact, is *not* the relevant unit, or at least not simply so. Communitarianism has a role in this analysis, but not one that the author wants to directly recognize because to do so would undermine his elevation of the atomistic individual as the sole consideration for moral calculations. That such an unfettered individual does not actually exist hinders Shermer not at all.

Even were one disposed to accept his premises, there is still the problem that Shermer is an unrelenting consequentialist: Something is or is not moral not because of any intrinsic virtues, but because it yields outcomes of which Shermer approves. Many others would tend to think that the ends do not justify the means. He attempts to argue otherwise when he claims that dropping the atom bombs in WWII was the moral thing to do not because it was right in some objective sense, but because, according to some analyses, to have done otherwise would have yielded more casualties in a direct invasion of Japan. So thumbs up on nuclear attack; nuclear war is today "immoral" only because this practical summing of casualties does not similarly favor its use. But should that calculus change, then bombs away.

We have recently seen a related debate (http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/the-limits-of-discourse) highlighting the distinction I'm drawing here. Sam Harris argues with Noam Chomsky that the 9/11 attacks were worse, although killing less, than Clinton's decision to bomb the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan, although killing more, because the former casualties were "intended" and the latter were not. Most commentators conclude that Chomsky's position came out better than Harris's. The problem for Shermer (who favorably refers to Harris in the book) is that Harris's position favors learned ignorance whereby I can retain my moral superiority by preserving my ignorance about the likely consequences of my actions. This undercuts Shermer's primary thesis that morality is advanced by learning. While not specifically a consequentialist argument, they share a common interest in defending prized outcomes arrived at through other means by giving them the veneer of being objectively rational. They are not.

He seems unable to separate a pragmatic consideration from a moral one, and goes so far as to equate them. This is not what most people mean by "morality," and in fact, given his views, it is unfortunate that he begins with an anecdote about MLK Jr. MLK did not argue that racial equality was the moral choice because it would be good for the economy or some such instrumental reason that Shermer would recognize as the basis of morality, but because racial inequality was an inherent evil. Equality would have been the right thing to do even if it had resulted in dreadful practical outcomes. But that is not Shermer's position, and frankly I found his consequentialism a poor basis on which to make broadly sweeping claims about "morality."

These threads combine to lead Shermer to assert that moral progress is inevitable with the advance of scientific knowledge. Thus, any potential extraterrestrial life we might encounter will necessarily be morally superior than we are: "any advanced civilization that survives long enough for us to make contact with it will also be a morally advanced civilization." The leap to this absurd conclusion, assuming as it does that every life form will have the same moral standards as we do, and that science is not a tool to be used according to our ethical choices but a force that independently forms moral consciousness, is staggering.

The book is not a difficult read, although it is probably much longer than it needed to be. At times his tone is condescending when speaking of other cultures whose traditions he disapproves. The reader is probably best advised to slide quickly over any mentions of supposed morality. The book may nonetheless be serviceable as a general overview of some themes in intellectual history and sociology and political science (all having little to do with ethics). To give Shermer credit, he recognizes this gap and tries to bridge it with an unsuccessful discussion on the naturalistic fallacy, as shown by his not fully understanding the advice given him by a Hume scholar. You can't get to 'ought' from 'is' because one can construct a link between any 'is' with any 'ought' (e.g., the empirical observation that animals engage in homosexual behavior can argue equally well that homosexuality is wrong because it's "animalistic" or that it is good because it is "natural"). Shermer sees only that, because he can construct arguments that lead to his favored outcomes, he has found a way around the logical prohibition. He hasn't. ( )