“Who was the ninja?” The answer given here: local farmers that armed themselves with simple weapons and conducted guerrilla warfare from the mountains. In asking this question, a group of political economists, historians and religious scholars seek to address Japan’s medieval period in a volume edited by Ferejohn and Rosenbluth. Collectively, these articles challenge numerous traditionally held beliefs about this period within the structure of peasant resistance / peasant security. One theme addressed by several contributors is that of geographic conditions to how the state emerged. The defensibility of mountainous regions meant that productive inhabitants did not need to rely on systems of exchange with militarized elite to nearly the same extent as inhabitants of easily traversable plains regions. Rather than attribute early demands for autonomy to some kind of latent racial yearning for self-governance, “resistance or acquiescence…followed a pattern of opportunity or necessity” (3). The centralization of power is thus collectively described as the product of social organization that resulted from the concentration of economic bargaining leverage that squeezed out smaller contenders in open spaces. Yet while the role of organizationally dominant centers retains a primary position in the transition to the modern nation-state, the choices of peasants are recognized as having significant influence on the kind of state that emerged. Along with farmers in the mountain country; seafaring pirates, the political arm of Buddhism, and outlying territories of Kyushu, Shikoku, and Honshu are addressed.

Karl Friday argues the validity of periodization on the basis of transition from centripetal to centrifugal distribution of power, based on the incremental evolution of samurai power. By rejecting traditional analogies with European feudalism, Friday minimalizes the importance of military privatization as the basis of governmental transition, arguing instead that samurai identified more with court officials of similar rank than with superior or inferior members of the warrior class, thus significantly delaying the transition to a militarist dominated state. Susumu Ike’s argument that the peasant’s call for peace provided a fundamental influence for the consolidation and centralization of power fits with and confirms well the arguments made in the initial article of the book as does Pierre Souyri’s discussion of small mountain communities. Tsuguharu Inaba continues this argument for the relevance and power of elements outside of the state by claiming a “revisionist” view that towns and communities retained significant autonomy well into the Tokugawa era, and that this autonomy provided the basis for a “robust modern society capable of democratic self-governance” (71). Inaba argues it was not until the 1930s rise of imperial fascism that villages identified themselves as part of a larger community that was Japan. Carol Richmond Tsang’s article is primarily a narrative of the annihilation of the last vestiges of autonomous control outside of the Nobunaga dominated center. Tsang argues through this example that there were multiple motivations outside of economic security that were effective at creating hegemony and allegiance. The final article by Thomas Conlan challenges traditional ways of interpreting the effectiveness of new technologies. I found Conlan’s argument particularly compelling, rather than interpreting the introduction of the gun as providing the key to Nobunaga’s success he reveals it was innovations in organization, economic domination, and logistical prowess that gave him the upper hand when confronting groups like the priests of Negoroji who possessed superior firearms and skill but lacked the support and mobilization necessary for resisting the crushing weight of Nobunaga’s armies.

Collectively these essays and article provide greater nuance to Japan’s medieval period, challenging assumptions of commonality and the significance of the state they argue for the agency and importance of the masses. They thus represent a transition from institutional history to a greater focus on society and culture. The work also represents a current trend in history to build bridges to social theory and creating predictive theory. The authors are further united in their desire to challenge the “Asia Mentality” which overly emphasizes the uniqueness of Japan. Kierstead’s article in particular challenges historians to examine Japanese historiography as history. While not necessarily path breaking in their conclusions, each represents a call to careful analysis of traditional assumptions. ( )