While purporting to be a complete guide to the Anglo-Boer disagreements of the nineteenth century, which mainly focused on the differing attitudes of Boers and British to the rights of the majority population of the Cape, Barthorp merely sketches the early history and does not devote much space to the First Boer War - for a good account of which see the book of that title by Joseph Lehmann - and concentrates mainly on the military aspects of the Second rather than the political (which is explored more fully in Thomas Pakenham’s The Boer War.

Both of the conflicts were characterised on the British side by the usual early lack of troops, muddle, disorganisation and, typical of the colonial era, underestimation of the enemy. In both wars the courage of the rank and file British soldier was never in doubt while the Boers were always adept. The political will at Westminster to carry on in the first war was lacking and so peace - with independence for the Transvaal and Orange Free State - came quickly.

Due to the influence of Cecil Rhodes and Sir Alfred Milner the same was no longer true in 1899 and the second war was prolonged. After initial reverses the British began to prevail when Lord Roberts - not long from his triumphant march from Kabul to Kandahar (some areas of conflict never change) - took overall command. Eventually the greater weight of British numbers and materiél as well as increased ability to deal with their more mobile enemy pushed the Boers into avoiding set piece confrontations and to rely on guerilla warfare - at which they were particularly effective. Even Kitchener’s blockhouse system failed to contain them.

In this context Barthorp mentions the collection of Boer non-combatants into camps and the subsequent toll of disease and death but does not see this as a great influence on the morale or effectiveness of the Boer commandos, though it was a propaganda calamity for Britain. He notes the eerie similarity of the battles of Majuba and Spion Kop in the two wars – both eminently avoidable battles for the British and both bloody defeats. He also gives General Buller more credit than I have seen him afforded elsewhere.

The book has occasional maps but a few more would have made certain of the troop movements clearer than the text manages.

Like some Boers a few British officers fought in both conflicts. Many of those engaged in the second war (French, Rawlinson, Gough, Ian Hamilton, Smith-Dorrien, Allenby, Mahon, Haig) and one of the Boers (Smuts) went on to have prominent roles in World War 1, though perhaps failing to learn fully the lessons of the up-to-date weaponry employed. A photograph of the British dead in the enfiladed trench at Spion Kop is reminiscent of one of the sunken road at Antietam in the American Civil War. 21,000 of the 450,000 Empire troops who were engaged overall died (62% from disease.) This explains the war memorials. There were 52,000 other casualties. Estimated Boer troop numbers vary from a curiously precise 87,365 to a rounder 65,000, with some 4,000 dead. An additional 20,000 Boers incarcerated in the camps also died.

While gaining independence in 1881 and then losing it in 1902 the Boers could curiously be said to have won in the second case also since in 1910, a scant eight years after the treaty of Vereeniging which ended the Second War of Independence, as the Boers called it, the Union of South Africa (including not only the Transvaal and the Orange Free State but also the erstwhile British dominated Cape Colony and Natal) was granted full independence within the Empire. The Boers swiftly came to dominate it and in 1948 completed the process by leaving the Commonwealth.

Barthorp notes a final irony. That while the Boers’ attitudes remained unchanged those in Britain who were most against fighting them in the nineteenth century had political heirs who were most forward in condemning the Republic’s policies regarding the black population in the latter twentieth century. (The book was published before the release of Nelson Mandela and majority rule.) He fails to point out the corollary, though. Those in favour of fighting the wars had political heirs who were against any interference with, or even criticism of, the apartheid state.