Although I only spent $3.00 on this work at a library used-book sale, there were some moments when I wanted my money back. I had mostly picked this item up for "lines on the map" history, and I didn't think that Watson was doing as especially good job with that. However, Watson did write this monograph with a certain mission, and that was to understand how Rommel's mystique as a general originated. In the author's opinion, much of this comes down to how Rommel seemed to be able to do great things with virtually nothing, helped along by both British and German propaganda building on the substance that was there. It also didn't hurt that elements of the Waffen-SS did not take part in this campaign, as their propensity for war crimes at the drop of a hat would not have allowed for the maintenance of the myth of a "war without hatred."

The reality is that this study verges on the obsolete, as while it does partake of the then still fresh "new operational military history," the dismantling of the myth of the virtuous Wehrmacht was really only beginning to build up steam. Both Omar Bartov and David Irving make their way into the bibliography. It is also arguable that at least one more pass of studies relating to the Desert War are in order, so as to really assimilate the Italian perspective. This is all a roundabout way of saying that while this book has its moments, you'd be better off with the relevant Osprey booklets for the details, and Rick Atkinson's "An Army at Dawn" for a general overview of the campaign in Tunisia (though the focus is on the U.S. Army). ( )