This is an interesting book on several levels. First and foremost, this trade paperback format contains many B&W photos throughout, many of which were new to me. Something that isn’t easy to accomplish as I have been a casual reader of WWII material for over 20 years. The text is ordered chronologically and focuses almost exclusively on his desert operations. The focus is mostly on the operational level with some vignettes of battle sprinkled here and there. The author’s basic thesis is that Rommel was the benefactor of a tremendous amount of luck early in the desert campaign that masked his flaws as a strategic commander. And that once the British got themselves organized, he was quickly exposed and defeated. It helps to understand that the author is British. His pro-British bias is noticeable from the start as well. It seems that he is on a bit of a crusade to set the record straight with respect to past assessments of the British mishandling of their forces in the desert prior to Montgomery’s command. This is an interesting perspective and while I happen to disagree with both, the book is still quite readable. Unfortunately, even with careful selection of the material, the author fails to really substantiate either of these points. There just isn’t an easy way to sweep the gross mishandling to the British armor from Rommel’s advent in the desert until at least the middle of 1942. Luck was a factor in some of Rommel’s successes to be sure, on the other hand some people make their own luck. Extensive reading on Rommel shows a remarkably bold and audacious man who pressed and pressed until the battle was won or lost. This style was almost the antithesis of the more conservative British command style. Macksey was one of two main sources I used for the “loyal opposition” for my research paper on Rommel’s command of Operational Art for LW516 (The German Operational Art). ( )