This was a battle, that could not be won, even with the shear numbers thrown against the objective. Instead it became a matter of US high command pride. An objective insignificant in the great scheme of things. An objective that could easily be by-passed with a containing force left behind to keep the Germans within the forest and supplies out. Instead the pride of generals prevailed over wisdom and hundreds of thousands died. Divisions nearly depleted, companies almost disappearing. An awful pride driven, military tactical mistake.

Hindsight, being what it is, can easily lay blame, where blame does not belong. This book and the background research has laid out a case for negligence and does not color those in charge in a very great light. To me, it seemed that the author is (rightfully) angry, and feels like there is something very personal beyond the loss of young lives.

Well written, insightful. As a student of WWII history, I had never encountered this battle in Hurtgen Forest and how expensive it was. The book tends to hammer home, over and over the ignorance and short slightness of the American command to a point of distraction. This book gets can easily convey the mistakes without so much fist thumping. I highly recommend this book, despite it being slow going at times. I recommend this book for those who love WWII history in great detail and presents thoroughly researched facts. ( )

Hurtgen Forest was one of the two most egregious US military mistakes of WW2; the other was Peleliu in the Pacific. Both undertaken to protect a general's flank in an attack; here it was Lawton Collins and MacArthur in the Pacific. Well documented and well written, it follows the cascade of decisions, at the senior command level, that cost thousands of casualties for an ill-defined mission, Almost at its conclusion, it was finally declared that the purpose was to prevent the flooding of the selected German Border destruction of dams.

Whiting does a thoughtful analysis for this battle but his tactical battle meter seems to be stuck at the Might Monty level, forgetting Caen, Sicily, Arnhem and the Scheldt Estuary cockups from his repertoire. General officership, except for the Germans who had years of practice, was generally abysmal for the allies with Slim and Smith in the Far East being rare exceptions. Others like Patton showed the occasional flare of success but the saddest news is how long, until after Vietnam, the WestPoint/Sandhurst syndrome persisted. ( )