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Sto caricando le informazioni... Epistemische Ungerechtigkeitdi Miranda Fricker, Antje Korsmeier (Traduttore), Christine Bratu (Introduzione), Aline Dammel (Introduzione)
Informazioni sull'operaEpistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing di Miranda Fricker
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Iscriviti per consentire a LibraryThing di scoprire se ti piacerà questo libro. Attualmente non vi sono conversazioni su questo libro. An "epistemic injustice" is one that wrongs an individual in their capacity as a knower. Fricker offers as examples the "testimonial injustice", where we discredit someone's conversational offerings on account of their identity (e.g., discounting what a woman says because "women are emotional, irrational creatures") and the "hermeneutical injustice", where we lack the language to express certain elements of one's own experience in a socially intelligible fashion (e.g., the difficult in characterizing "sexual harassment" before that term became popularized in the 1970s and 80s). These wrongs seem to be in some ways obvious, but these problems are often skipped past in philosophical work (or assumed not to exist); Fricker gives the issue the attention and rigor it deserves. It is entirely worthwhile that this book as been a force within feminist philosophy circles for close to a decade now. Moreover, Fricker writes with a clarity and lucidity that does not always typify philosophy works. This is a book that can be read and enjoyed by intellectually curious persons of any background. Highly recommended. nessuna recensione | aggiungi una recensione
In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy,but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is emepistemic injustice/em.The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice,virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern ofsocial injustice. Non sono state trovate descrizioni di biblioteche |
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Google Books — Sto caricando le informazioni... GeneriSistema Decimale Melvil (DDC)121Philosophy and Psychology Philosophy Of Humanity EpistemologyClassificazione LCVotoMedia:
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I debated between giving the book 3 or 4 stars because much of it was illuminating and a lot of the ideas were helpful in uncovering some serious ethical problems in how people are treated. However, the book was sometimes a little heavy on the jargon, which made the reading a bit stilted. I'm also not persuaded by her argument against and inferentialism or for virtue epistemology, which made some of the scaffolding for her account less secure for me. That being said, the book is still well worth reading—in fact, due to its impact, I would say it's required reading in modern social epistemology. ( )