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Sto caricando le informazioni... German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870–1916 (2005)di Robert T. Foley
All Things Germany (125) Sto caricando le informazioni...
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Appartiene alle SerieCambridge Military Histories (2005) Premi e riconoscimenti
Risorse esterne che parlano di questo libro Wikipedia in inglese (22)Almost 90 years since its conclusion, the battle of Verdun is still little understood. German Strategy and the Path to Verdun is a detailed examination of this seminal battle based on research conducted in archives long thought lost. Material returned to Germany from the former Soviet Union has allowed for a reinterpretation of Erich von Falkenhayn's overall strategy for the war and of the development of German operational and tactical concepts to fit this new strategy of attrition. By taking a long view of the development of German military ideas from the end of the Franco-German War in 1871, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun also gives much-needed context to Falkenhayn's ideas and the course of one of the greatest battles of attrition the world has ever known. Non sono state trovate descrizioni di biblioteche |
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Google Books — Sto caricando le informazioni... GeneriSistema Decimale Melvil (DDC)940.4History and Geography Europe Europe Military History Of World War IClassificazione LCVotoMedia:
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These general trends are not exactly news, but what informs this book is access to archival material once thought permanently lost, so one now has a better sense of the process by which policy was generated.
Also, one has a better sense of the situation in which Falkenhayn operated, in which he tried to drag a German officer corps towards new truths, only to be undercut by both his distinct lack of respect for his foreign opposition and his poor skills of persuasion.
If I mark down this book for anything it's that the author really can't connect the pre-war strategic debate to the choices that Falkenhayn made, but that is probably the unfortunate result of Falkenhayn's over-secretive nature; he would be the last man to admit the influence of another on his thinking. ( )