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Sto caricando le informazioni... Atoms and ashes : a global history of nuclear disasters (edizione 2022)di Serhii Plokhy (Autore)
Informazioni sull'operaAtoms and Ashes: A Global History of Nuclear Disasters di Serhii Plokhy
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In 2011, a 43-foot-high tsunami crashed into a nuclear power plant in Fukushima, Japan. In the following days, explosions would rip buildings apart, three reactors would go into nuclear meltdown, and the surrounding area would be swamped in radioactive water. It is now considered one of the costliest nuclear disasters ever. But Fukushima was not the first, and it was not the worst. . . In Atoms and Ashes, acclaimed historian Serhii Plokhy tells the tale of the six nuclear disasters that shook the world- Bikini Atoll, Kyshtym, Windscale, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima. Based on wide-ranging research and witness testimony, Plokhy traces the arc of each crisis, exploring in depth the confused decision-making on the ground and the panicked responses of governments to contain the crises and often cover up the scale of the catastrophe. As the world increasingly looks to renewable and alternative sources of energy, Plokhy lucidly argues that the atomic risk must be understood in explicit terms, but also that these calamities reveal a fundamental truth about our relationship with nuclear technology- that the thirst for power and energy has always trumped safety and the cost for future generations. Non sono state trovate descrizioni di biblioteche |
![]() GeneriSistema Decimale Melvil (DDC)363.179909 — Social sciences Social problems and services; associations Other social problems and services Health and Safety Hazardous materials Specific types of hazardous materials Radioactive materials, nuclear accidentsVotoMedia:![]()
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> the main source of contamination was the radiation control point itself. Radioactive particles washed off dirty vehicles stayed on the spot, and, as people walked from dirty buses to clean ones, they picked up radioactive dust and carried it into the buses and their apartments.
> Britain’s first atomic establishment became known as the brainiest town in the country. If one counts people with degrees, it turned into one of Britain’s most educated places. And they had smart children, too—the grades in local schools were higher than anywhere else. One former pupil recalled that they could not get a physics teacher in their school because the quality of the homework was so high that regular teachers of physics were afraid to take the job
> Frustrated, Yoshida, who knew that a delay in pumping seawater into the reactor might cause a second, much more damaging explosion, decided to ignore both the prime minister and TEPCO. “I continued with the pumping of seawater based on the judgment that the most important thing was to … prevent the spread of the accident,” recalled Yoshida later. He called in one of his managers and told him: “I am going to direct you to stop the seawater injection, but do not stop it.” He then gave a loud order in front of the cameras of the telecommunication system linking him with TEPCO headquarters to stop the pumping. Despite that formal order, the pumping continued.
> “When I heard about the evacuation request, I was feeling that I had to stake my political life on resolving the situation,” recalled [Prime Minister Naoto] Kan later. “That made me feel the request was totally out of line.” Kan’s aides shared his sentiment. “We must ask TEPCO to hold the fort, even if they have to put together a suicide squad,” said one of them. TEPCO officials denied that they had ever suggested complete evacuation of the site. Instead, they had allegedly considered the evacuation only of nonessential personnel. The videoconference footage that TEPCO was later forced to release suggested otherwise, supporting Kan’s understanding that the company was prepared to abandon the station altogether. (