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"The German Air Force was a failure. This is the cardinal fact about Hitler's Luftwaffe and one of the most important of the Second World War. Yet it is also one of the most neglected. Historians have tended to concentrate on the Luftwaffe's meteoric rise, its brilliant victories in the first two years of the war, won against enemies substantially inferior in both numbers and quality, and on the outstanding feats of its pilots and field commanders which continued until the end. In contrast this book places strong emphasis on the Luftwaffe's failure. It analyses why the Luftwaffe lost command of the air over Britain in 1940, over the Atlantic in 1941, and over the Mediterranean in 1942, and how by mid 1943 it was incapable of taking the initiative in the air anywhere over Europe. It shows that the German Air Force ceased to be of any significance in the outcome of the war by the end of 1943. The cost of this failure to the Third Reich was high. It ensured that whatever was decided in the Reich's Chancellery, and whatever was done in the front line and in the factories, defeat wouild result. In this, the first detailed, comprehensive history of the Luftwaffe since 1946, Matthew Cooper describes the disintegration of its high command and the disastrous leadership of Göring. He analyses the development of the Luftwaffe's strategy, and with it its aircraft, and its decisions regarding dive bombing, heavy bombers and jet fighters. He describes the Luftwaffe's campaigns and shows clearly how from the moment it was committed to battle in 1939 it was doomed to failure in any prolonged world war. With hindsight it is possible to see that its one chance of avoiding defeat lay in destroying the RAF in the summer of 1940 and this book carefully analyses just why, when it was within an ace of success, the Luftwaffe gave victory to its enemies. Matthew Cooper has produced a well written and thoroughly researched major work, a worthy successor to his highly acclaimed book on the German Army. Each represents a major contribution to the history of the Second World War." -- Front jacket flap.… (altro)
"The German Air Force was a failure. This is the cardinal fact about Hitler's Luftwaffe and one of the most important of the Second World War. Yet it is also one of the most neglected. Historians have tended to concentrate on the Luftwaffe's meteoric rise, its brilliant victories in the first two years of the war, won against enemies substantially inferior in both numbers and quality, and on the outstanding feats of its pilots and field commanders which continued until the end. In contrast this book places strong emphasis on the Luftwaffe's failure. It analyses why the Luftwaffe lost command of the air over Britain in 1940, over the Atlantic in 1941, and over the Mediterranean in 1942, and how by mid 1943 it was incapable of taking the initiative in the air anywhere over Europe. It shows that the German Air Force ceased to be of any significance in the outcome of the war by the end of 1943. The cost of this failure to the Third Reich was high. It ensured that whatever was decided in the Reich's Chancellery, and whatever was done in the front line and in the factories, defeat wouild result. In this, the first detailed, comprehensive history of the Luftwaffe since 1946, Matthew Cooper describes the disintegration of its high command and the disastrous leadership of Göring. He analyses the development of the Luftwaffe's strategy, and with it its aircraft, and its decisions regarding dive bombing, heavy bombers and jet fighters. He describes the Luftwaffe's campaigns and shows clearly how from the moment it was committed to battle in 1939 it was doomed to failure in any prolonged world war. With hindsight it is possible to see that its one chance of avoiding defeat lay in destroying the RAF in the summer of 1940 and this book carefully analyses just why, when it was within an ace of success, the Luftwaffe gave victory to its enemies. Matthew Cooper has produced a well written and thoroughly researched major work, a worthy successor to his highly acclaimed book on the German Army. Each represents a major contribution to the history of the Second World War." -- Front jacket flap.
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