Most leaders during a time of war have the advantage of leaving memoirs - Churchill's six volume History of World War II - to help us understand their reasons for the decisions they made. Franklin Roosevelt did not. Nigel Hamilton's three volume set attempts to do this on his behalf. Hamilton does not spend as much time on the events of the battles as many other works which makes this set less a history than a psychological biography. The Mantle of Command focuses on the political aspect of a sitting President during his unprecedented third term having to shift his way of thinking from mostly domestic issues as America is trying to pull itself out of the Great Depression to a focus on more international issues as America becomes "the arsenal of Democracy." It further shows the difficulty in the early part of the war to bring his top military leaders into line without totally alienating them. Until I read this volume, I was not aware how divided the Chiefs of Staff were in their planning or of their reluctance to accept Roosevelt's strategy. The leadership and political acumen Roosevelt shows is truly amazing.

Hamilton's writing style is perfect for most of today's readers. His narrative is highly organized, yet easy to follow. By not dwelling on the minute to minute details of battles but the general development of the war, he makes the history more personal to the average reader. This is the type of work that might cause a mildly curious person to want to learn more about Operation Torch and serve as a springboard to broaden their interest.

For those who want to see hard hitting accounts of battles this work may be disappointing. However, for those who want to see a person in a leadership position develop and broaden his leadership skills, this is an excellent work. This set of three definitely belongs on the shelves of the student of America's and the world's greatest war. ( )

A worthy historical account, but also the most openly opinionated history text I have ever read. Admittedly, other historians may still offer their opinion by what they include or not include in their narratives, but they would have done it much more subtlety by letting the reader "jump" to the conclusion that the author may have made clear. In this case, the author quite often offers a conclusion, albeit with considerable prior evidence to back that conclusion up. I'm just not so used to the author being so blatant about it. However, all of this gets off the main point and advantage of this historical account on FDR that gives the book weight and value, this first in a trilogy is specifically about a president, namely Roosevelt, as the Commander-in-Chief of the United States, leading up to and throughout World War II. This book takes us into Pearl Harbor and to the landing of U.S. troops in North Africa in late 1942. I have already read a few individual accounts of World War II, but more comprehensively about the European and Pacific theaters of war via the first two volumes of Ian W. Toll's excellent Pacific War trilogy, which covered the eastern Pacific half of the the Pacific Theater, namely the naval half, as well as the first volume of Rick Atkinson's equally excellent Liberation Trilogy, which covers the European Theater of the war. With that two-sided background of the 1941-1942 war period from a military history perspective, it was easy for me to follow and assess for myself the White House-based, Commander-in-Chief part of the war. Frankly, I was impressed by this narrative of the first part of the war. The author gives great credence to FDR's skills at this point in time. The average reader will likely be more, not less, impressed by him as a president. Douglas MacArthur, unfortunately will not be. I had already read two other historical accounts of MacArthur, both from World War II and the Korean War that were far from flattering. This book introduced new material to me that makes me wonder why he was ever a general. (Think Donald Trump but without bone spurs.) On a different note, this author had what I would call a strange summary of the American landing in North Africa. To believe this author, the landing was all but child's play, while Rick Atkinson's account made it clear that was not the case. Perhaps, the degree to which this was a "walk in the park" is a product of how many American deaths is considered acceptable for a park walk. Regardless, I look forward to reading the other two volumes of this trilogy, but will be ready for critical assessment of the author's further accounts. ( )

5553. The Mantle of Command FDR at War 1941-1942, by Nigel Hamilton (read 26 Apr 2018) This is a 2014 book, the first of two volumes, studying FDR's course as commander-in-chief of the United States during World War Two. The author is English born but lives in the u.S. His book aims to do justice to FDR's role in leading the U.S. military in World War II. It never fails to show FDR in the best light, and denigrates Churchill and British forces during the years 1941 and 1942. He says General Marshall and Secretary Stimson and other American military were eager to launch a cross-Channel invasion of France in 1942, which the author says would have been disastrous and miht have enabled Hitler to win he war. He says FDR was in favor of invading North Africa and pushed for that course against U.S. military men and the British--and that Marshall and Stimson almost mutinied when FDR insisted on that invasion. The book has footnotes which lead me to think that Hamilton relied on few sources and was eager to support his view of FDR being right. I am not sure that Hamilton doesn't let his thesis of FDR being right and most others being wrong color his objectivity, eager though I am to believe what he says. The book gives a view of the momentous months of 1941 and 1942 which is quite different from other accounts I have read. ( )

Excellent review and analysis of FDR's transition into a wartime commander in chief and leader of the nations united against the Axis. His breadth of vision and understanding of the roles that logistics, planning, and training must play in the creation of the military means needed; are quite beyond those of his generals and his allies, even Winston Churchill. His charm, tact, and perseverance are severely challenged by the tunnel vision and parochial last war thinking of Marshall, King and Secretary of War Stimson. The British, after two years of trying had yet to win a land battle and the Americans, had yet to fight one but each was adamant that they had the solution. Roosevelt, correctly, discerned that the Brits were too weak and the Yanks were nowhere near ready nor able. The learnings, about logistics from Guadalcanal as well as the leadership and training deficiencies during the Kasserine Pass Battle, were unfortunate demonstrations of his foresight. ( )