I picked this book up because I have recently read an account of the Nazi invasion of the Netherlands in May 1940 (Ryan Noppen's Holland 1940; the Luftwaffe's first setback in the West), which looked at Fall Gelb ('Case Yellow') from the point of view of the Dutch air defences. Noppen was a neutral author, and painted a picture of Fall Gelb that is rather at variance with the standard history of the Blitzkrieg in the West. I immediately looked to see what perspective this book offered on the same subject.

Lucas' book is written from a different perspective, using accounts from many of the German Fallschirmjäger (paratroops) themselves. It came as little surprise, then, to find that this gave an account of the campaign in the Netherlands that reinforced the German view that victory was achieved through the shock tactics of force projection and the rapid support of forward airborne forces by the timely movement of armoured forces in support.

Noppen's account suggests otherwise. The Dutch possessed an effective centralised air defence network which was able to alert airfields to Luftwaffe formation movements in the initial stages of the attack. This meant that air defences were alerted to the threat and were able to mount an effective defence. In the five days of Fall Gelb, 455 of the German aircraft deployed were put out of action by the Dutch, 69% of which were the Junkers Ju.52 transports that the Germans intended to rely upon for the insertion of the second wave of airborne assaults (let alone the subsequent invasion of Britain). Only 35% of the intended total of German troops were landed by the end of the day one of the operation, and many of those were out of position in relation to their objectives; more than 2,700 out of 3,500 of those troops became either casualties or prisoners of war. The PoWs were handed over to the British, who had facilities for handling captives; hence these troops were not returned to service after the Netherlands fell.

So this history, at least as far as the invasion of the Netherlands is concerned, is definitely written by those who survived the initial wave of the attack, who were quite happy to relate their account of their eventual victory and their part in it. The real reason for the Dutch surrender - that Goering threatened to reduce both Rotterdam and Utrecht to rubble through aerial bombardment if the Netherlands did not surrender - was way beyond the level of those who provided their account of the victory for this book. The surviving foot soldiers' view of victory or defeat is based wholly on what they saw, and only reinforced by what they are told later. So we get accounts of individuals seeing Ju.52s damaged by opposition fire - but they saw the ones that made it back to base, not the ones left burning on beaches.

As far as the invasion of the Netherlands is concerned, then, this is definitely history written by (or in this case, on behalf of) the winners. It simply reinforces the German propaganda of the invincibility of those who planned and carried out Blitzkrieg. It should be read with that in mind.

Be aware however, that this is my initial reaction based on the chapter I read because another account of the same action was fresh in my mind. A deeper review will follow my more detailed reading of the whole book.