As the Psychological Warfare branch of the Army morphs into the Military Information Support to Operations branch it is possible to evaluate the history of the profession to determine that the new nomenclature is not far from the mark. The United States, or more specifically the Allied powers in World War II, shaped a propaganda strategy which became the genesis of this name change; which adequately describes the methodology of American propaganda operations.
In her book, You Can’t Fight Tanks with Bayonets: Psychological Warfare Against the Japanese Army in the Southwest Pacific, Allison B. Gilmore extrapolates on psychological warfare as it applies to the Pacific Theatre of World War II. As an associate professor of American history with a specific interest in Southwest Pacific military operations in World War II, Ms. Gilmore did extensive research and information gathering for this book. Her writing is a testament to her extensive understanding of psychological operations against the Japanese during World War II.
Ms. Gilmore has written You Can’t Fight Tanks with Bayonets to enlighten readers about the prominence of psychological warfare in the Pacific Theatre of battle. There is a widespread belief that the Japanese Soldier of World War II was infallible and unaffected by propaganda, shown by a willingness to fight to the last man. Ms. Gilmore refutes this claim and unmistakably shows that propaganda empirically played a part in the war against Japan. While her book caters to the military enthusiast as a historical clarification, it would be remiss not to note that there is a lot of parallels which could be drawn to other past and present conflicts. In this way, it serves as a tool to learn from history in order to better apply this particular sort of propaganda in the future.
Ms. Gilmore’s book primarily follows the operations of the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) and more specifically the Far East Liaison Office (FELO) in the Southwest Pacific Theatre during World War II. FELO was commanded by Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, a man who showed he understood the Japanese psyche when he published The Psychology of the Japanese Soldier in 1935. Some of the principles in his book he would bring to fruition during his strategy against the Japanese including the “prohibition of propagandists from criticizing or attacking the emperor of Japan” ; thus, FELO was well-led by a subject matter expert who undoubtedly played a role in the organization’s success.
BG Fellers quickly established the themes which his organization would work under to support Allied victories. One of the main themes of his strategy was that propaganda was only useful when it supported military victories and that it was only successful when Soldiers were experiencing hardships of combat or tactical losses on the battlefield. Ms. Gilmore points out that post-war study has shown the most effective propaganda was against those who were experiencing starvation, continuous air bombings, bad immediate leadership, or sickness. Word War II proves that psychological warfare does not work sans military success but succeeds as a force multiplier to decrease the amount of fighting in subsequent battles within the immediate area and operations to “mop up” resistance. Despite this secondary relationship with the conventional military, psychological warfare has been shown to be effective, specifically in the Southwest Pacific Theatre of World War II. Ms. Gilmore recorded a report from the U.S. Sixth Army about a specific type of propaganda known as “surrender passes” which explained to Japanese Soldiers how to surrender to Allied forces. The report noted that “almost 70% of all prisoners surrendering made use of surrender passes or followed exactly the instructions contained in them.” Additionally, she reports various incidences of POW’s accounts of their reliance on Allied leaflets for news concerning the war, propaganda affecting their decision to surrender and influence the propaganda had on their world-view of the war and their role in it.
Throughout the book, Ms. Gilmore affectively makes her case concerning the importance that psychological operations had on Japanese Soldiers. Ms. Gilmore’s use of primary sources is impressive as she extensively quotes FELO and PWB intelligence reports. This literature truly brings to light the strategic methodology of American psychological operations; not only in World War II, but presumably as they exist at present. FELO’s stringent requirements that propaganda be truthful, are a very interesting development that has probably influenced the current changes in nomenclature to MISO. This is a technique that definitely worked in this theatre as Japanese Soldiers, in some instances, seemed to trust enemy leaflets over their own superiors.
The beginning of Ms. Gilmore’s book was a little tough to get through as it slowly describes the genesis of the PWB in the Southwest Pacific Theatre. It quickly increases in pace and readability after that slow start. It would certainly help to have a military background in order to read this book, but would not be required to understand the main themes. Any leader that is deploying to Afghanistan or any Soldier that is dealing with local nationals in a long-term capacity would do well to include this in their list of books to read before deployment. It truly defines the criteria to positively influence the population as well as pontificating on the limitations of psychological operations. Any MISO Soldier is remiss if he has not studied this book and the specifics of the operations along with the associated statistical and empirical analysis of success and failure provided by Ms. Gilmore.
You Can’t Fight Tanks with Bayonets is about a true supportive Special Operations branch which acts as a force multiplier when correctly used by commanders and supported by frontline Soldiers. Ms. Gilmore gives a good overview of psychological warfare’s positives and drawbacks as it applied to the Southwest Pacific Theatre which allows the reader to generalize the core principles of such a profession and a knowledge of how best to employ it. ( )