Fatal Bleief

When some kind of tragedy befalls us, we often put it down to 'fate'. Humans have always been fascinated by destiny since the dawn of time. So are we in control of our own, or are our lives predestined no matter what we do, or whatever choices we make? Are we at the mercy of 'fate' as to whether life turns out good or bad for us?
I believe that what happens is down to us. We are going to be far more motivate to take charge of our own life, if we make an effort to set goals to accomplish. It's too time consuming, in getting bogged down in debates about whether this life is all there is, whether it is down to the breaks that other people give us. or whether fate is to blame our mistakes or tragedies in life.
I think we should simply live each day as if were the best day so far. Fate doesn't exist - but all the same, tomorrow will always take care of itself.

I think there's two different questions at work here. Because I think the way we popularly use 'fate' assumes some kind of being controlling our fate. Fate has some kind of sense or telos to it. Contrast this to hard determinism which is a theory seeing human decisions as being just as mechanistically predictable as basic classical mechanics.

So when you ask about fate, it's really two questions:

Do we have the ability to make a choice? (Defined as being able to do that which I did not do.)

If yes, then free will. If no, then hard determinism.

Is there a being controlling this choice?

If no, then determinism from scientific premises, as seeing all human behavior as in principle predictable. If yes, then fate or religious predestination.

But while you've answered your question of whether or not there is fate with a NO, your reasoning is that we will be more motivated to take charge of our own life if we are in charge of it, if we have free will. However saying a belief makes people more happy doesn't seem like a good reason to believe it. I might feel happier if I believed that Santa Claus brought me free gifts every year, but that doesn't give me good reason to argue that that belief is true.

I have a friend who does not believe in free will - she is a hard determinist - and she says she is much happier as a determinist. She says it's quite liberating to no longer have to play the blame game - with anything.

I don't know that determinism requires predictability? Would not determinism require causality, but allow for randomness that would remove any chance of prediction on an individual level. The law of large numbers would provide for predictability of a sufficient sampling, but not at the level of an individual.

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The way I see it, two ideas to be teased out.

The way you're using "predictability" is in the sense of outcomes of various probability. When I say "predictability" I mean that an outcome is certain. In classical Newtonian laws, if I drop a ball, it's not probable it will fall, it's certain.

The hard determinist would say that yes, human behavior is just as predictable and certain in its outcomes as whether or not the ball drops. We may never know all the incredibly complex laws and initial conditions (necessary for predicting final conditions) in the human physical and psychological system, but it is still knowable in theory. And if knowable in theory, then predictable, since scientific explanations are tied to prediction. Whether or not I'll eat chocolate in the next five minutes and whether or not the ball drops when I let go of it are equally predictable in theory. Only the latter one is predictable in practice.

So to the hard determinist, or to the one who believes in fate, whenever we think we are making our own choices out of free will we are simply deluded.

Personally, I have always believed we had our own free will, which we use to decide for ourselves which directions in life to take. This of course, brings responsibility for our own actions, and any wrong choices made can only be blamed on us. But believing in fate, as you say, as though it were some sentient being, is a difficult thing to accept. Difficult, if you like, to being expected to believe in a God. Our very make up allows us the opportunities to decide and plan our own lives, and not leave our future outcome to be decided by some unknown entity, who we can then blame for wrong choices made that would be our fault. I'm sure it is liberating to be a determinist, but by being one we seem to lose something we have the ability to do, and that is be an individual with our own thoughts and ideas which we are able to, either in a good way or bad, see to fruition.

In a long discussion here on LibraryThing about free will, modalursine, as I abstract from all he said, claimed first that there is no way around determinism, so there is no free will; causality demands no free will. When randomness, say from quantum considerations, is brought to bear on causality, he points out, there is still no entrance point for free will; we simply have a new cause determining our actions. I have for a long time believed that belief in free will or belief in no free will is a matter of faith, but I couldn't answer modalursine.

I got the Oxford Handbook of Free Will and read a substantial beginning portion hoping to for that answer. I can no longer stand up for free will. It is something of a despairing situation to be in, but of course the despair is determined too.

Robert

I can no longer stand up for free will. It is something of a despairing situation to be in, ....

Robert, I am sorry to hear of your despair. What was it about the book that led you to that situation?

My picking up the book was simply a deliberate attempt to extend the discussion into a world of expertise but with the hope that the question of whether there is free will would remain undecided. It seemed that the book was going to go onto some areas of free will that, to me, are not free will, that is wherein one is forced by causality to make a decision but it is a decision one would make if one had free will, for example. That is to say there was no justification or even possibility of substantial free will.

Despair falls out of that in that I am powerless, but in a way that is comprehensive or entire. Twelve step programs have taught me to recognize my powerlessness in many areas (which is liberating) at the same time encouraging me to do such things as pray and serve. But I have no choice. I will pray or serve as causality demands. So besides the fact that my intent may be thwarted, I cannot even develop intent. My future, a dim one as it is, was decided with the big bang.

If I do something that throws light into that dim future, it will not be because I decided to do it and did, but that a chain of causes led to it. I will find energy to rescue the world or eat right as causality lets me (compels me).

Robert

I am still deciding in the morning whether to shave or brush my teeth first. So far so good. :)

But, I don't think the prediction of a ball dropping is in the same realm as predicting a decision. And not just because of the differing complexities involved. The decision process I think has more random aspects that make the initial circumstances unknowable, even theoretically, assuming determinism. The ball is a large enough that accurate predictions can be made about its motion upon being dropped.

But as I am moving quickly beyond what I have read and understand on this issue, I will take a seat in the quiet area.

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In one way it's despairing. In another it's liberating because you no longer have to mentally assign blame to people. You can be more patient when you realize they couldn't have done anything other than the stupid thing they did!

One of my friends takes this so far as to say she would not blame her husband for cheating on her (if he did). However she would punish him to deter future occurrences. This doesn't rely on free will, simply Pavlovian behavioral training. She just wouldn't be able to say "...and he deserved it!"

Robert

I was and am under the strong impression that the question of free will is still undecided and has worthy proponents from every side. I looked up Robert Kane, the editor of your book, and he seems to be on what I would consider the side of Good; he believes in free will. Maybe you didn't get far enough into the book the hear the other side.

Robert Kane is discussed in this article on Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will. (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories) The apropos quotes at the end are "Perhaps the best that can be said here is that there is currently no good evidence that determinism is true." and "our current understanding of the brain gives us little evidence one way or the other about whether (there is a complete independence of mental events from physical events) is in fact so. At best, it seems we must remain, for the time being, agnostic about this matter"

Keep the doubt Brother. Keep the doubt.

It's an interesting topic, and one that goes back to the beginning of philosophy. Historically, most schools of philosophy were fatalist or determinist. It is only recently that belief in 'free will' has become popularly accepted. It's part of the individualist culture we live in, where everyone thinks he or she is the determiner of his or her own fate.

A few questions come to mind: If humans have free will, do animals? If animals don't, and are only acting on instinct or conditioning, then how do humans have free will? How do you evolve free will? By what process of natural selection does that occur?

I think free will requires a kind of duality: a spirit or soul which is not part of the chain of cause and effect, and can make decisions without regard to causality. Really, I don't see how you can be a materialist and not be a determinist.

Maybe Daniel Dennett can explain it for you. Try Freedom Evolves. He is a materialist who believes in free will.

Okay, I've added Freedom Evolves to my wishlist.

One can have determined outcomes without being able to predict them. When operations are extremely sensitive to starting conditions, for example, it may not be possible to predict the outcome. Furthermore an absence of universal determinism say from quantum randomness does not entail free will.

Those people who say what they would do if someone else did something in the absence of free will are neglecting that what they would do is not a matter of free will. The decision as to whether I will be patient with the wife beater next door is not mine to make although it may seem that it was.

If the generally denied dualism actually holds, there may be an excuse of free will. If the entangled liquid in neurons can be used by the mind to make decisions independent of causality, there may be an excuse for free will.

If I see a way to believe in free will, I will, but I am doubtful about it now.

Robert

Robert,

My recommendation of Freedom Evolves was for mapoet as I think it directly address the questions he asked. Myself, I think the book, while an interesting read, is fundamentally flawed. Dennett is after all one of the Four Horseman of the New Atheists (although they are down to Three Horseman now, which is a pity) and he suffers from the most extreme infection of the Darwiniitus virus. He may not be of much help to you. I would recommend trying More Than Matter by Keith Ward. I haven't read it yet (I just added it to my wish list), but mean to, and have liked some of his other stuff. It sees it might more directly address your issues.

Oh, and maybe a book written by Robert Kane, not just one he edited.

Okay, More Than Matter is on my wishlist too.

Robert

A super-acceptance of determinism is required for complete understanding, this cannot come from the self which contemplates but from the super-self. The simplest illustration is that the self accepting the idea of determinism is still trapped within the game, acceptance will not be enlightening. lilbrattyteen's friend in >2 JDHomrighausen: would need to accept that she will remain in the game where she will continue to blame and cry and worry and doubt and so on, but only her super-self can see the determinism from beyond the game. This is non-communicable except as a secondary impulse from within the game.

therealdavidsmith, I'm a little confused about exactly what "super-acceptance", "super-self", and "game" mean in this context. Is "super-acceptance" meant to be an exclusively doxastic condition that leaves behavior untouched? Is the "super-self" meant to be the self-reflective faculty of the mind, i.e. that which thinks about its own thoughts? Is the "game" the realm of bare behavior untouched by theory and pure understanding? If this is all correct, then I suppose you just mean that we must all treat free will as true in our everyday lives, regardless of whether we accept it intellectually. I agree with this, as did Kant.

As for the discussion of this thread at large, I think the alleged conflict between determinism and free will is misguided. Taking lilbrattyteen's definition of choice rephrased (having been able to do otherwise than I did), I don't think that determinism necessarily contradicts this. It's true that, under determinism, we Would not have done otherwise than we did, but it is not true that we Could not have done otherwise than we did. In other words, under determinism, our neurons and environments have been arranged in such a way that we would inevitably want to act in the way we did indeed act, we would have chosen to do what we did inevitably. However, we still chose to do it. If we had wanted to do otherwise, then we could have. Inevitability does not cancel out choice. It was still myself that determined to do x, even if what myself consists of was in turn determined by y.

I would say that the boundaries of the game contain anything which can have an effect on the game, the self is included in this, as is its acceptance of the game, its understanding of the game and any other emissions it has. The super-self is not contained therein, it was not caused by the game and it cannot effect the game. The moment the self becomes aware of the super-self it would be effected by it, ergo it can never be aware of it. I do not see how determinism can be explained satisfactorily from within the game without the idea of the super-self.

What if you lose the game?

Win or lose, you go up or down a level.

How do I know you're the real David Smith?

Ask the other ones.... let me know what they say.

So...... In an attempt to bring this back to what it was meant to be, I'll give my main argument for believing that free will and determinism exist together.

Determinism is often described as a completely rigid and (obviously) predictive situation, and free will, being the opposite, is random and unpredictable. Generally people say you can't have these things in conjunction, but I think you can. Think of a random number generator - here we see something that gives a completely unpredictable result but is held within certain constraints (how many digits, range of numbers, etc). Why wouldn't we be able to function the same way? Certainly our environment effects us and limits the choices available, but could we not still be unpredictable within those options left to us?

Just my thoughts :)

Interesting debate.

>26 TarynRex:: I agree that determinism and free will can and do co-exist. However, there's one flaw in your random number generator analogy: human beings aren't numbers. Every single human being doesn't respond to the same situation in the same way because we all have very different innate psychological traits.

Our age is rather obsessed with the idea of free will giving us total control, but previous ages understood that you can do everything right, and everything honourably, and bad things can still happen as result. Have you ever read any traditional-style tragedies? They are the perfect example of how fate and free will work in conjunction with each other. I'll use Alfred Noyes's poem, The Highwayman for an example.

Bess and the Highwayman are in love with each other (fate). Bess will do anything to keep the man she loves safe (free will). So when the King's men come to the inn to trap the highwayman when he comes to visit Bess, it is inevitable that she will do something to warn the highwayman to stay away (fate).

The ostler is in love with Bess (fate). He knows she is in love with another man, and will do anything to dispose of his rival for Bess's affection (free will). So when he overhears the Highwayman tell Bess that he will come to her in secret the next night, it is inevitable that he will tell the King's men so that they will come and arrest him (fate).

The King's men have a duty to arrest all those who break the law (fate). They know that Bess will warn the Highwayman if she can, so they tie her up, gag her, and tie a musket "beneath her breast" as an extra deterrent to prevent her from trying to warn him of their presence at the inn (free will). However, they could not possibly know that Bess would be so determined to protect the man she loves that she will pull the trigger on the musket herself and take her own life, rather than live to see him captured or killed (fate).

The Highwayman is as devoted to Bess as she is to him (fate). He will gladly lay his life on the line to protect or avenge her against anyone who dares to hurt her (free will). So when he discovers that the shot he heard that saved his life the previous night also caused the Bess' death, it is inevitable that he will avenge her death or die trying (fate).

Fate, as previous ages understood it, was not the influence of omnipotent being, but the natural result of several people with opposing goals coming together in a way no one could have predicted. Fate was seen as a natural result of free will.