Robert G. Tanner

For all that I have read about the Civil War over the years, the Valley was always somewhat of a mystery to me. Overshadowed by the titanic campaigns in eastern VA it always seemed a bit of sideshow. But this book gave as complete an account at least from the southern perspective as you are likely to find. I now have a far deeper understanding of the unique dynamics and complex movements of the period from late 1861 through June 1862. This is probably not a book for people with just a casual interest in this campaign. There is abundant detail, exhaustive documentation, and several appendices discussing the orders on various critical days and how they were or were not interpreted, misunderstood, carried out completely, partially, or not at all. Any reading of Civil War battles and actions will be full of such situations, although Jackson's odd leadership seemed to invite more than most. Despite his obvious drive and brilliance, it is clearly evident that Jackson had serious flaws. Primarily in his tendency to expect too much out his soldiers and even himself. Falling asleep at a critical juncture at the Peninsula being a prime example. The Valley Army was highly fortunate to escape relatively intact several times due to the excessive demands placed upon it by Jackson (Port Republic stands out on that score). Perhaps this almost insane audacity was required to hold off forces that if combined were about 4 times the size of the Valley Army. The maps are about the only thing somewhat lacking and in a book full of complex maneuvers over highly varied terrain it is enough to detract 1-star.… (altro)

This massive work about Thomas J. Jackson's valley campaign (revised from the 1976 edition) offers a close look from the Southern point of view. Usually, the campaign is presented as a set-piece of Jackson outgeneralling mediocre Union opponents (Banks, Fremont) according to a preconceived masterplan. Tanner instead shows how Jackson had to adapt and revise his plans to accomodate superiors (Johnston, Lee), fellow generals (Ewell, Loring, Ed. Johnson), inferior supply and unruly cavalry. While Jackson achieved local numerical superiority on many battlefields due to marching his infantry ruthlessly and tirelessly across the valley, he never wiped out an opponent completely. At the end of the campaign, Jackson and his troops were spent. Instead of rest, they participated in the Seven Days campaign where their numbers were essential but their performance mostly mediocre.

The book is well-researched and lively. Its approach is similar to Freeman's Lee's Lieutentants focussing on Southern strategy and command,but Tanner also interweaves first-hand testimony of privates and civilians. Although an appendix deals with the Northern strategy, I would have welcomed more information about the other side. Also, the maps are only of average quality. Overall, an important work about a famous sideshow of the American Civil War.… (altro)