Galen Strawson
Autore di Things That Bother Me: Death, Freedom, the Self, Etc.
Sull'Autore
Galen Strawson is professor of philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. His many books include Freedom and Belief and Selves. an Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics.
Opere di Galen Strawson
Opere correlate
Debates in Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses (Key Debates in the History of Philosophy) (2012) — Collaboratore — 10 copie
Etichette
Informazioni generali
- Data di nascita
- 1952
- Sesso
- male
- Nazionalità
- UK
- Luogo di residenza
- England, UK
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, Australia
Texas, USA - Istruzione
- Dragon School, Oxford, England, UK
Winchester College, Winchester, Hampshire, England, UK
Oxford University
Cambridge University - Attività lavorative
- Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin
literary critic
philosopher - Relazioni
- Strawson, P.F. (father)
Strawson, John (uncle) - Organizzazioni
- University of Texas, Austin
Utenti
Recensioni
Liste
Potrebbero anche piacerti
Autori correlati
Statistiche
- Opere
- 16
- Opere correlate
- 8
- Utenti
- 365
- Popolarità
- #65,883
- Voto
- 4.0
- Recensioni
- 3
- ISBN
- 48
- Lingue
- 1
The four essays on the self, narrativity, No Loss future, the unstoried life, intersect in the idea that people are psychologically of the types he calls endurant (the endurers) and transient (the transients). The former would have a strong sense of themselves as historic selves unified across past present future, the latter would not and would tend to feel constantly renewed (Strawson counts himself in the latter type, a transient).
There is some (but not deterministic) connection between these types and the tendency to "storify" one's life, to see one's life as a coherent narrative, and one's identity as a particular "character" one invents and performs. Presumably the "endurers" would more often tend to this Life-as-Narrative view than the transients, who would be more apt to understand their life as a series of more or less unlinked episodes. Strawson argues against what he calls the "narrativist" view--in short, life for him is always something that happens outside our scenarios. To impose a "story" on a life is an exercise in ultimate inauthenticity.
The idea of No Loss future also hinges on the endurer/transient division. Strawson argues that one cannot be said to lose a future, because future is something we never have by definition. So, death causes us no loss.
I really should have read this essay again but I'm in a hurry to get to the topic that interested me the most. However, I will note (I do intend to come back to this some time) that this essay nonplussed me in several ways, with Strawson not going where I thought the argument would lead and then me finally not understanding why he cared to make it at all in such artificially constrained manner. For one thing, he limits himself to a single type of dying, what he calls "IPU annihilation"--instant painless completely unforeseen annihilation--a person extinguished like a light. Clearly this makes for a philosophically "cleaner" situation, where we just think of death in terms of loss (or no loss) of future time. Except he also has to mention that he's thinking only from the POV of the deceased, not their relatives etc.
So at the core this looks to me no different from the ancient Stoic argument--yes, someone you loved has died, but looking at it from "their" POV, nothing has been lost because nothing can be sensed to have been lost, so instead of self-centredly grieving, find solace in that now impersonal, uninhabited space that is "their" non-grief.
And yet I think Strawson would have believed he's saying something new so I probably missed something and so should go back. But later.
There is an essay on free will and the debate on whether it exists or not which is to me frankly ridiculous and the argument I have least patience with in general. Long story short, I think there is no earthly reason why we should atomise "free will" when we are perfectly in agreement not to do so in regard to everything else. Do you look at a desk and see a mad swirl of quanta? Does it bother you that you do not? Does knowing that the object "desk" is at some level a mad swirl of quanta (as, for that matter, are you and everything else material around you) affect in any way your daily conduct of life? Would you claim that not seeing objects at this quantum level impedes your knowledge and use of them at higher levels of structure?
If no to all that, what's the problem with applying the same reasoning to "free will"? What's so special about it anyway, why don't we get in knots regarding all our thoughts, feelings, sensations, all the mental experiences we are conscious of but can't control--can't even observe on the molecular or that quantum level that doesn't phase us when we look at a desk?
From a scientist's point of view, just as for us "macro" beings it doesn't matter to perceive a desk on the "micro" level in order to be able to say that we see a desk, use a desk, know what a desk is etc., it ALSO doesn't matter that our experience of "free will" is on some level outside our observation and control.
Regarding "free will" the only question that REALLY matters is taking responsibility for one's actions on the "macro" level on which we interact with people and conduct our conscious lives.
Which brings me nicely to that topic that interests me the most, consciousness. Strawson devotes two essays to the topic and already for them alone it would be worth getting this book. They concern what Strawson calls The Silliest Claim, which is that consciousness doesn't exist. The most interesting thing about this, to me, who could be described as a sheltered scientist (as I think most scientists are, when it comes to philosophy), is that I'm hearing that finally--FINALLY--people outside exist who are seeing freaking physics for what it is, in "real-life" size, and not as the be-all and end-all and paragon and bloody ultimate model of science. Biologists knew for a long time (and plenty have written about it too, calling for and suggesting other paradigms) what damage the apotheosis of physics has done to science, the idea that "science" is something we know in terms of physics (and would know perfectly if only blasted quanta behaved like obedient little marbles of the mechanistic glories of the yore.)
Briefly, our physics is a science of structures and their relations but it doesn't characterise experience. And because physics doesn't characterise experience, some philosophers have decided that it makes more sense to say that experience (consciousness) doesn't exist, than that physics is limited; A science, not THE science. Bertrand Russell: "Physics is mathematical not because we know so much about the physical world, but because we know so little." We don't know the limits of the physical. We don't know physics.
This isn't a movement to bring back vis vitalis or the supernatural. Strawson is a complete "naturalist" and materialist--everything that is, is natural and physical. Including consciousness. This can't be stressed enough. Nature is physical, brains are physical, minds are physical, consciousness is physical.
We know for certain that we exist and that we have experiences (are conscious). These are facts of concrete reality, what Strawson calls a real realism about experience, such as children have and people in a "pre-philosophical" stage (including philosophers before they became philosophers).
Music to my ears. Imagine a philosopher who accepts the taste of lemonade as a valid fact and possible starting point of concrete research instead of a figment of imagination, a philosophical object deconstructible into a nothingness that is deepest darkness.
It behooves me to mention that Strawson logically brings up and defends as philosophically valid the notion of panpsychism, which may sound weird to some. Rather than butcher that problem, which I know very superficially, I'd remind of the work of Christof Koch and others--a far cry from the ancient "soul-based" ideas...… (altro)