Boris Vadimovich Sokolov

Boris Sokolov’s biography of Marshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovsky is a noble effort to document the life and history of one of the most accomplished Soviet commanders to come out of the Second World War. The subtitle, “The Red Army’s Gentleman Commander,” serves multiple purposes as it immediately highlights that other Red Army commanders were “ungentlemanly” and it allows Sokolov to pontificate somewhat on a subject he covers in numerous publications – the true losses the Red Army suffered were much higher than those presented in published works. In general Sokolov’s biography walks a less than fine line between academic study and a polemical work. He takes a few too many literary licenses when he goes off on tangents here and there that have no place in a historical work but in a general sense this biography is still full of valuable information.

Sokolov discusses Rokossovsky’s history and youth in the first few chapters and covers his exploits in the Revolutionary/Civil War period. The most interesting parts of the book are those that cover Rokossovsky’s actions during the Second World War, or the Great Patriotic War. In part this is not the fault of Sokolov as there is little enough information available on Rokossovsky from his youth (Rokossovsky wanted to write about the Civil War but never had a chance). The majority of Rokossovsky’s major campaigns are covered by the author: his actions in 1941 and clashes with Zhukov, the Moscow Counteroffensive and his thoughts about what was done correctly and incorrectly, the operations around Stalingrad and Rokossovsky’s role in the destruction of the German Sixth Army, operation Kursk, operation Bagration, the Home Army’s Warsaw Uprising, and the final battles for Germany. Before continuing I will say that one of the weaknesses of this volume is that while there are many quotes (more so than western readers might be used to) and the author utilizes a range of archival documentation and published archival collections there is a distinct lack of endnotes/footnotes (something the original volume undoubtedly suffers from as well). Sokolov is in no way making this information up, as I have some of the collections he uses and can verify the information he presents in a few cases, but the problem remains in that this volume becomes problematic as a source. Furthermore, some of the source material is dated, unfortunately alternatives were/are hard to find.

Coming back to the text itself, the more interesting chapters were those on the Warsaw Uprising and the final battles/actions of the Red Army in Germany. Here is where Sokolov presents a wide variety of interesting and pertinent material but at the same time goes off on tangents and at times simply makes up statistics. The Warsaw Uprising is presented well enough with a lot of information provided from a number of eye witnesses (both Polish and Soviet) but primary source material is a bit sparse for the conclusions he makes. We know that Soviet forces suffered losses trying to reach Warsaw, with the 2nd Tank Army losing close to 1,000 tanks and having to be taken off the line. Similar attempts to by the 1st Polish Army resulted in losses for a variety of reasons but Sokolov insists on pointing toward Stalin as the cause. Even though orders were given to take Warsaw that’s not good enough, for Sokolov armies needed to be moved over to Rokossovsky’s front, supplies diverted, other operations cancelled and postponed, all to help the Poles in Warsaw. From an ethical standpoint, yes, everything should have been done to aid the Warsaw Uprising. Unfortunately reality dictated otherwise, the Poles were in an unenviable position and acted in their own best interests then relied on Stalin’s apparent good graces and that of the Red Army to support them in taking the capital of Poland to use as a bargaining chip against Stalin. They were asking for quite a bit from a man and armed forces they held in high contempt.

Finally, the chapter on the Red Army’s actions in Germany at the end of the war there are two arguments Sokolov expands on. First is the issue of losses in the battle of Berlin. He argues against the provided figure of 81,116 irrecoverable losses because in that figure are included losses for the two Polish armies that participated in the battle for the city. Irrecoverable losses for both armies were 2,825. Sokolov cites an “official” report from the Polish Defense Ministry that lists killed and missing in action as 11,000, almost four times as large a figure. What he does then is argue that since this figure is a quarter of the number presented by the Russians then all other losses during the Berlin operation should be multiplied by four. He utilizes the same argument in other places and I’m simply unconvinced. I appreciate coming across new information and presenting it (I appreciate it more if it includes a citation) but an extrapolation based on limited evidence is unacceptable for a historian or an academic publication. A similar argument is utilized when discussing the Red Army’s progress through Germany and Eastern Europe in terms of atrocities and rapes. There’s no doubt that Red Army soldiers, as well as soldiers from national contingents serving within the Red Army (Poles among them), committed atrocities against the Germans, including wholesale plunder, murder, and rape. Similar actions were committed when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, the allies invaded Western Europe, or the Japanese invaded China. But to paint an entire armed forces with such a broad brush is unacceptable, at least in my opinion. In terms of degrees it might very well be that the Red Army’s occupation proved that much more detrimental than that of the allies, unfortunately qualifying some of the actions of Red Army soldiers will prove impossible. What Sokolov does well enough is present a variety of eye witness accounts to some of the actions that happened on the ground, but he offers little to nothing as explanation for why these criminal actions happened. Recently Filip Slaveski, in his “The Soviet Occupation of Germany,” offered an enlightening look at the Soviet occupation of Germany including the crimes committed. Sokolov aimed for emotions, Slaveski offers that and an attempt to explain what happened along with why.

As much as I appreciate Sokolov’s efforts, there are quite a few weaknesses here that make this far from a definitive study of either Rokossovsky’s life or his actions within the confines of the Second World War. In part this is a result of many archives still being closed off to research within the Russian Federation but I would also argue that Russian academic standards are still somewhat lacking when compared to their Western equivalents. Furthermore, while there are some excellent historians within Russia they are still working within a state that continues to view its present as a reflection of past accomplishments and shies away from attempts to take a closer look at its history for fear that a crack in the foundation will unravel a collection of myths better kept under a Potemkin village façade.… (altro)

Many have written on the history of the Second World War in Russia in the past twenty to thirty years. Gorbachev’s ‘glasnost’ opened the way for new questions, ideas, theories, and accounts from the Stalinist period, including the Eastern Front. Unfortunately, with all the new information that became available many took it upon themselves to begin writing sensationalist books that flooded the market and continue to do so today. Thus, the current Second World War book market in Russia is a mixture of historical monographs, journalistic and amateur accounts, and sensationalist conspiracy theories. ‘The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War: A Re-Examination’ falls somewhere in between all three. The author, Boris Sokolov, was forced to resign from his position as professor of Social Anthropology, which automatically raises questions about his historical background.

What Sokolov and many authors like him do well is raise questions that have yet to be answered in a satisfactory manner. Unfortunately, often the questions they raise are pushed beyond their boundaries and become the basis of ill-defined generalizations and fallacious comparisons. Thus, throughout this slim volume of articles that were previously published in Russian newspapers or western academic journals, there is some interesting information offered but it is missing valuable context and is warped by numerous theories that already exist in Russia, which Sokolov latches onto with his own version of events and evidence.

The initial chapter discusses the oft-repeated idea by conspiracy theorists that Stalin was preparing to attack Hitler in the summer of 1941. This is usually most associated with the likes of Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun), even though the initial creator of this myth was Hitler himself who declared the invasion of the Soviet Union a pre-emptive strike against gathering Red Army forces who were poised to strike against Germany. While Suvorov grasps at every straw that’s available to him, be it real or imaginary, Sokolov utilizes the simplistic idea that because an order was issued to create a Polish division by 1 July 1941, an invasion was imminent. He points to the corresponding creation of a Finnish Corps on the eve of the Soviet invasion of Finland, but curiously enough fails to point out the entire lead-up to the invasion of Finland and juxtapose it with the diplomatic situation on the ground in the spring and summer of 1941. The rest of the chapter offers little of substance or new information to those already familiar with the eve of the war on the Eastern Front.

The more interesting chapters are those on the Battle of Kursk and Lend Lease. In the case of the former, Sokolov makes an interesting point in his discussion of whether it was ideal to wait for the Germans to attack or whether an earlier offensive by the Red Army against a Wehrmacht lacking Tigers, Panthers, and Ferdinands would have garnered greater success and fewer losses. Unfortunately, he doesn’t offer enough information about the strengths and weaknesses of both sides in April or May of 1943, nor does he analyze the weather conditions or logistical constraints that either side might have been under. It’s easy to pass judgment by simply mentioning a few figures, harder still to analyze the entire contextual situation that existed on a month-by-month basis. The more interesting aspect of this chapter is his discussion of the losses the Red Army sustained. Unfortunately, his example is limited to the Central Front and a figure of some 50-60,000. There is no adequate explanation for why the Central Front is listed as containing 738,000 men on July 5, yet numbered 645,300 on July 12 when it supposedly only suffered 33,897 casualties. The only Order of Battle change was the departure of two rifle brigades and the arrival of a tank brigade, at best a change of strength of some 5-7,000 men, according to Sokolov. Yet no explanation is offered of why such a drastic change in figures exists. The author believes this represents an undercounting of losses, which is the simplest explanation and there’s no doubt that undercounting existed in every army (who doesn’t want extra rations?). While this is the only real evidence Sokolov presents about the undercounting of casualties, he readily begins to apply this formula (undercounting by around 1/3) to other operations, creating a generalization out of one example. When discussing Red Army losses in general compared to the Wehrmacht, Sokolov comments that the ‘unfavorable ratio of losses may be explained by the superiority of the new German tanks and also the superiority of German command and control in armor combat.’ While this analysis is undoubtedly accurate in some scenarios, Valery Zamulin has shown quite well that the losses the Red Army sustained were a result of a combination of factors, few of which can be analyzed without understanding the greater context of specific engagements, forces utilized, etc.

The chapter on Lend Lease seems to be a limited analysis of random equipment and materials and again lacks context. Yes, it is important to stress that value of Lend Lease supplies and the fact that the Soviet Union played down the aid it received while some in the west believed it represented a lifeline in the fullest sense of the term. Unfortunately, Sokolov doesn’t do a great job in getting his point(s) across. He discusses aviation fuel but fails to offer a breakdown of deliveries by year. There is also no breakdown of motor vehicle deliveries by year nor does Sokolov discuss the fact that Soviet domestic production of motor vehicles could have been increased if the need arose at the expense of light tank production, which was being curbed as is by the latter years of the war due to the dominance of the T-34. The reason Soviet domestic truck production was so low was because they knew that Lend Lease trucks were supposed to be delivered, but this is left out of Sokolov’s discussion(s). Thus, similar to previous chapters, the author discusses important subjects and brings up relevant examples only to then exaggerate their value and importance without adequate context and analysis.

The last two chapters deal with losses and to some extent overlap each other. The more interesting look at the Soviet Union’s losses once more shows that serious research is still needed to give a more credible account and understanding of the devastation the Soviet Union experienced and how well or poorly the Red Army performed throughout the war. Sokolov again points to interesting information but fails to accurately analyze it. For instance, he lists the number of prisoners of war the Soviet Union sustained from 1943-1945 as 604,000 by Soviet estimates while German data gives a figure of 746,000. Yet there is no mention made of the fact that the Germans counted anyone of military draft age as a prisoner of war, no matter if they were part of the Red Army or were civilians (and there are accounts of civilians in German POW camps). This is also why the figures of the prisoners taken from the Kiev encirclement in 1941 differ when Soviet numbers are compared to German ones. Sokolov is also quick to dismiss Germany’s allies when calculating losses, his reasoning being the Red Army suffered fewer losses and Germany’s allies didn’t actively participate during the entire war. Not what I’d call an objective analysis.

There’s much more one can say but the above is a good representation of what this thin volume offers. For those interested in understanding how much of Russia’s literature on the war is written this is a good starting point that features a middle ground between historical analysis and journalistic tendencies that create the ability to exaggerate and sensationalize without adequate understanding. Due to the limited archival access that was available to historians interested in writing on the Eastern Front within the Soviet Union, the end result was a plethora of literature that said little but never failed to exaggerate socialist heroism and economic abilities. Today’s Russian historians, journalists, and amateurs have access to much more information but lack a foundation or grounding in how to properly analyze and present the raw data at their disposal. The end result is that all too often the right questions are asked but adequate answers are not always forthcoming.… (altro)