Andrew F. Smith (1) (1946–)

I would have given this book 5 stars (engaging, informative, well cited and annotated), except that it gives no thought or credence to the idea that the tomato could have spread to the American south, southwest, and Mississippi valley by virtue of Indian trade, rather than by Spanish colonization. I find it easier to believe the Aztecs introduced the tomato to the Texas/New Mexico/Louisiana area centuries ago than the Spanish came, conquered, took the tomato back to Spain, then re-imported it to the Americas.
Other than ignoring the native/indigenous people, a good read.… (altro)

Interesting topic, indifferently handled. Author Andrew F. Smith normally writes on food topics; he’s written histories of tomatoes, popcorn, peanuts, turkeys and hamburgers. Here he takes on food logistics in the Confederacy. It’s definitely a popular rather than scholarly work; Smith’s approach is lots of paragraph-length anecdotes, taken from contemporary newspaper stories or from letters from hungry soldiers. This is all interesting enough but there is no overview to tie everything together. Smith does make an important point; the South’s food problem was mostly due to food transportation and distribution rather than food production. The South produced plenty, but couldn’t move the food to places where it was needed – the cities and the armies. The antebellum South had been heavily dependent on coastal traffic, which was interdicted by the Union; the roads and railroads were inadequate to move supplies. Smith puts some of the blame on laissez-faire and state’s right politics but also claims that many farmers were reluctant to produce more than subsistence levels for their own families, since the Confederate government sent agents to confiscate surpluses – hardly a laissez-faire policy.


Although there was food inflation in the North during the war – according to Smith, about 63% over the four-year period – it was nothing compared to the South, where food process rose by 10% per month during 1863 (for example). The North, of course, also had much better transportation logistics; the Army of Northern Virginia was on subsistence rations for most of the war despite being based in the most agriculturally productive part of the South; the Army of the Potomac was at the end of relatively short coastal and rail supply lines that brought more than adequate food to the front. Smith discusses Thanksgiving in 1864, where private groups attempted to provide a turkey dinner to every soldier in the Army of the Potomac and every sailor in the North Atlantic Squadron; it was by and large successful (all a letter from one soldier at a distant outpost reported his dinner was “pretty mouldy” when he finally got it, but he ate it anyway). The South attempted to counter but Thanksgiving and then Christmas came and went before they could get it organized; finally a New Year’s Dinner was attempted but didn’t come off very well. The amount of food collected was small, and in some front units had to be distributed by lottery. Smith claims this was one of the final blows to the morale of the Army of Northern Virginia; I can see how it might be.


An easy read – finished in an afternoon. No illustrations; footnoted but some claims are not referenced. An extensive bibliography, although it’s mostly general histories and biographies without much specializing in food production or logistics. However, for $3 from the remainder bin it was worthwhile.… (altro)