Peter Shinkle

Not so many ago, in a land not so far away, Democratics and Republicans, rivals domestically, joined to win World War II. “Uniting America” is their story. The main actors were President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Army Secretary Henry Stimson and Navy Secretary Frank Knox. Theirs is an extraordinary tale. These were no RINOS or mere tokens. Henry Stimson had served as United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York under Theodore Roosevelt, unsuccessful candidate for governor of New York, Secretary of War under William Howard Taft, Governor General of the Philippines under Calvin Coolidge and Secretary of State under Herbert Hoover. Newspaperman Frank Knox had been the Republican nominee for vice-president in 1936.
Though circling each other for decades in New York politics, Stimson and FDR first met, at the president-elect’s request, at Hyde Park on January 9, 1933. During what probably constituted the presidential transition of 1932, the two exchanged thoughts on issues, resulting in Roosevelt’s adoption of Stimson’s declaration that Japan’s annexation of Manchuria violated international law. Thus, began perhaps the most important bipartisan political alliance n American political history.

Timing of their moves was crucial. Accepting appointment just before the Republican National Convention of 1940, Stimson and Knox sent a challenge to the isolationist wing of their party and may have affected the election of that year. As amazing as GOP stalwarts joining a Democratic administration, was FDR’s willingness to turn leadership of the war making arms of government over to the very loyal opposition. During and after the campaign, Stimson served as a back-door conduit to Republican 1940 presidential nominee, Wendell Willkie in obtaining support for, or at least preventing open opposition to crucial legislative initiative. Willkie’s support for a form of selective service and silence on the deal to transfer destroyers to Britain facilitated approval of programs on which American preparedness depended.

Controversy could not be avoided. Stimson’s correspondence to Republican Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge noting that his knowledge and experience “will greatly enhance your usefulness to the country as a a United States Senator” threw FDR into a rage. When Stimson issued a ruling that active-duty Army personnel could not seek political office, Republicans claimed it attempted to prevent a presidential run by Gen. MacArthur.

Wielding the investigator’s equivalent of a jewelers’ magnifier, Author Peter Shinkle searches each facet and detects every flaw to account for impacts of the Roosevelt-Stimson partnership. Stimson admitted that the President’s project that materialized in the Doolittle raid had positive morale results domestically and internationally, but produced Japanese reprisals in China. Stimson appointed Gen. Joseph Stillwell to Command in Burma over Chiang’s objections, frustrated the President’s plan to name New York mayor Fiorello LaGuardia a general, employing him instead in radio broadcasts to Italy, and persuaded FDR to insist on an American commander of Overlord over a Briton with flagging enthusiasm for the invasion. President and Secretary cooperated in a minimally successful proposal for federal ballots for soldiers and sailors that ran into partisan and racially motivated opposition. Chapters are devoted to struggles over rights for black Americans and the forced internment of Japanese-Americans and their impact on the reputations of Roosevelt Stimson and Knox. Perhaps their most prescient initiative was for party realignment, with liberals congregating in the Democratic Party and conservatives in the Republican. Neither would live to see it, but we have. Are we better off today than we were in an age in which partisans saw cooperators across the aisle, rather than exclusively within their own parties?

The ascension of Harry Truman brought a diminished role for Stimson. Perhaps reflecting his preference for officials tested in electoral strife and limited confidence in his own abilities, the new president turned to Secretary of State James Byrnes for advice on issues of peace. Shinkle provides an excellent account of the internal debate over whether to permit Japan to retain the Emperor in a peace settlement or to continue to demand unconditional surrender and use the atomic bomb to end the war. Truman followed Byrnes until after the bombs had been dropped, only to accept surrender with the Emperor as Stimson had been recommending for months.

Some reviewers have criticized the Epilogue for its unfavorable comparison of President Trump and other contemporary figures to the Roosevelt-Stimson team. I view the Epilogue as the author’s attempt to tie historical precedent to current challenges. Readers and reviewers should be cognizant of the message of this work which is, as stated by the author, “we did it before, we can do it again.” Those agreeing with the description of recent event will enjoy this to the end. A different view of the Epilogue is fair, but should not diminish appreciation for an excellent and, in my experience unprecedented, historical study of an otherwise overlooked segment of our history.… (altro)

In 1940, Americans embraced isolationism. The horrible losses of WWI were still fresh. What business did we have ‘saving’ Europe in the first place? America First advocates included prominent men like Charles Lindbergh and Henry Ford. Fascism was taking over Europe with Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany. Some thought fascism was the inevitable next step, like Joseph P. Kennedy believed while serving as ambassador to Britain, or that there was no stopping Hitler anyway so why try. And besides, for capitalists, it was better than communism.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt was up for reelection in1940 and feared the Republicans would choose an isolationist challenger. If America did not aid the allies, Nazis would take over all of Europe. And they might not stop there.

FDR came up with a bold plan. It was an idea that seems incomprehensible in today’s political climate. He would unite America by his example. His cabinet would be bipartisan. He appointed Republicans to his cabinet; Henry Stimson who was secretary of state under President Hoover, and Frank Knox, the 1936 vice presidential nominee would be secretary of the navy–the post FDR himself once held.

In an unexpected move, the Republicans nominated Wendell Willkie as their nominee. As Republicans in FDR’s government reached out to their party’s liberals, Willkie became an ally as well, even agreeing to not attack specific FDR policies while on the campaign trail.

Shinkle shares Stimson’s diary and documents to support the history he writes about, and yet it almost defies belief. At the end of the book, he shares that subsequent presidents used bipartisanship—or not, in the case of Donald Trump.

Stimson played a pivotal role in FDR’s government. He had been a critic of the New Deal, and would challenge FDR when needed. He had supported President Wilson’s declaration of war in 1917. And he supported ending the Neutrality Act which curtailed American aid or financial transactions with any foreign country at war. Under this law, America could not aid a country that was attacked by an aggressor. He supported American intervention in Europe and promoted FDR’s policies of lend-lease, and later the draft.

The battles they fought were rife with conflict. FDR was under pressure to Integrate the army, with a planned march on Washington forcing his hand. The integration of war industries led to white violence against blacks. These policies led to Southern Democrats to leave the party.

With FDR’s death in office, Stimson was sidelined by President Truman. The history suggests the use of the atom bomb was unnecessary. Stimson urged Truman to share the weapon with the allies to prevent a “secret armament race;” as we well know, Truman ignored that advice and we have lived with an arms race ever since.

FDR and Willkie had discussed reshaping the political parties after the war, moving the liberals of each party to the Democratic side and the conservatives to the Republican side. Their early deaths prevented them from following their plan, but their vision proved to be inevitable.

Shinkle reminds that there are some embers burning of bipartisanship today, but to save American democracy, President Biden and Republicans must be willing to “look beyond the narrow interests of political parties” to do “what is right for the country and democracy.”

It’s an amazing story about amazing men, the like of which we have not seen in a long time.

I received a free egalley from the publisher through NetGalley. My review is fair and unbiased.… (altro)