Christopher M. Rein

Starting with the question of what air forces can do, as opposed to what they should do, Rein uses the deployment of the American air arm to the Mediterranean as a case study in this question. Essentially, having made the transition from being a simple tool of co-operation to the progress of ground forces to an operational mode that acted as a force multiplier at the theater-level of combat (with great success it might be noted), the USAAF could not help itself but pursue an independent "strategic" mission in the form of the infamous 1943 raid on the Romanian oil industry; which had the knock-on impact of minimizing the Allied ability to disrupt the German evacuation of Sicily and making the conquest of Italy that much more difficult. It is interesting that we have reached the point where an instructor at the USAF's service academy can conclude that the much-cherished independent mission can be a distraction from the most efficient methods of contributing to overall victory.

It also occurred to me in the process of reading this work, and how the author deals with the Army Ground Forces' desire for air power they could see in action (direct support) versus the USAAF's offer of indirect support (interdiction and seeking air superiority) that the ground-forces commanders must have had an image of the morale of their fighting men as being very brittle; as if the American rifleman would not fight unless being supported by every modern weapons system in obvious evidence.… (altro)