Nick McCamley

On the morning of 27th November 1944, an underground munitions store at RAF Fauld, near Tutbury in Staffordshire, exploded with a force of some 4 kilotonnes. (To give some idea of scale, the atomic weapon detonated over Hiroshima had a yield of some 15 kilotonnes and the ammonium nitrate store explosion in Beirut in 2020 was some 0.5 kilotonnes.) The Fauld explosion showered rock, debris and munitions over a wide area, many of the munitions causing secondary explosions. The explosion also breached a reservoir adjacent to the store, which flooded a nearby gypsum works and a number of houses. Property damage was extensive; estimates of the casualties vary between 70 and 90, both RAF personnel and civilians. The resulting crater was a quarter of a mile in diameter and 100 feet deep.

The cause of the explosion was determined to be down to one particular airman, who was attempting to remove the detonator from a defective 1000-pound bomb that had been returned to Fauld for repair having been jettisoned by a damaged bomber returning from a mission. The airman was using a brass chisel, known to produce sparks when used on steel, in contravention of all safety instructions and his training.

Nick McCamley has set out to tell the story of the Fauld disaster; in doing so, he recounts the entire story of munitions storage, supply and maintenance in the UK from 1934 onwards. Although much of the material is expanded from earlier books by McCamley, specifically his Secret Underground Cities (1998) and Disasters Underground (2004), this is not just padding. The chain of circumstances that led to the Fauld explosion have their roots in Air Ministry policy decisions, RAF operational decisions, and inter-Service rivalry. A shortage of suitable sites, penny-pinching in construction specifications and laxity in personnel training and management also contributed to the eventual disaster. The RAF should have had a wake-up call following the collapse of the roof of an underground munitions store at Llanberis in North Wales on 25th January 1942; fortunately, that incident did not lead to any munitions detonating, but no-one seemed to consider just exactly what sort of calamity had been avoided at that point. As a precaution, munitions were removed from another store, Harpur Hill (near Buxton in Derbyshire) which used the same construction techniques. All these bombs had to go somewhere, and the depot at Fauld, located in a disused gypsum mine, was the only choice.

The author describes very clearly the chain of events that, in retrospect, seem to lead almost inevitably to disaster. He illustrates the account with extensive maps, plans and photographs (both contemporary and modern) showing the location and layout of the stores. Photography is first-rate.

Indeed, the photography is so good that it may give a false impression that the remains of these munitions dumps are light and airy spaces. They are not. McCamley has used multiple flash techniques to produce remarkable photographs that show the remains of these installations in incredible detail (I had never imagined that there was so much left underground at Fauld); but the photographs are deceptive, Many were taken in 1987, and quite a few taken at Fauld show the results of ground movements subsequent to the explosion. The situation cannot have improved in the intervening 34 years, but the uninitiated reader might be tempted, on the strength of these pictures, to try some illicit exploring of their own. This is not recommended - indeed, the author comments that on one expedition, he and his companions were trapped by a new debris fall and had some worrying minutes before they were able to extricate themselves. But this is one of my criticisms of the book - nowhere does it directly say "Do not attempt to enter underground workings of this nature, especially at Fauld itself". Although damage and some of the risks are mentioned in the text such that a reasonably astute reader would take note of them and act accordingly, it cannot be said that every reader might be so astute. The Ministry of Defence, who still own the site, have posted warning notices around the site warning of unexploded ordnance; but it is remarkable how many people seem not to be able to read warning notices. The consequences of treating this as a guidebook rather than a fascinating record could be fatal.

My other criticism concerns the production of the book. There are a number of errors in the graphics - maps illustrating sites have locations identified in the key which are not on the map, and some detail plans are shown without an orientation point and so are not presented with a consistent alignment. Things are further complicated by some errors and omissions; a small ammunition store in the Forest of Dean, for example, consisting of two disused railway tunnels with portals facing each other some 50 yards apart, has its two tunnel names transposed on the accompanying map. There are other instances where text and diagrams have not been cross-checked against each other. There are also instances within the text where quotations from reports, shown in italics, do not have those italics carried forward into a new paragraph which is formatted as if the quotation consisted of one paragraph only. And there are a number of undetected typographical errors.

These errors are a shame, because otherwise this is a valuable book, throwing light on an important part of the British military effort in World War 2. There is so much emphasis placed on the activities of the RAF in the European theatre of operations, but very little attention paid to the massive support infrastructure that facilitated those operations. Sadly, it took a disaster here at home to prompt this excellent book which helps redress some of the balance.… (altro)