David A. Graff

A comparative study of Byzantine and Chinese war-making ca AD 600, principally as described by respectively the Strategicon, attributed to the emperor Maurice, and the (now fragmentary) "Military Methods" of Li Jing, a member of the Tang imperial family. Graff finds that there is much more similarity than difference, which he attributes to the fact that both writers based their recommendations on experience as leaders of sedentary armies fighting Eurasian nomads (in the first place Avars and Turks, respectively).

On a wider theoretical front, he uses this to argue against the notion of a "Western Way of War" as advocated by Hanson, Keegan, and other military historians, supposedly differentiated from non-Western traditions of war-making in emphasizing face-to-face fighting rather than evasiveness and trickery. Graff finds that Byzantines and Chinese both did plenty of each, and moreover insists that military strategy is much more responsive to conditions and less predetermined by cultural dictates than Hanson would allow.

Interesting and convincing, if decidedly niche.… (altro)

This is a very good book about China's political and military history during the period from the heyday of the Western Jin dynasty to the fall of the Tang dynasty. The period saw periods of internal unity and external expansion, as under the early Tang, but also long periods of fragmentation and foreign invasion, as during the time in the 4th and 5th centuries known rather graphically as the "Sixteen Kingdoms of the Five Barbarians".

Graff deals mostly with the strategic and operational levels, tactical detail being in any case sparse in the sources (especially it appears before the late 6th century), and almost not at all with fighting techniques at the individual level, nor much with equipment. There is a good deal about organization and recruitment - subjects well loved by military historians because the bureaucrats in charge of them tend to write down what they do - but at times one would like a bit more clarity as whom exactly was being organized and recruited. For example, did the various concurrent recruitment systems under the early Tang turn up the same sorts of soldiers, or were some used, say, mainly to raise cavalry and others infantry? But that's a minor complaint; overall this is, as said, a very good book.

While undoubtedly a tough read for anyone wholly unfamiliar with Chinese history, sinological jargon is minimized and the book is definitely within reach of the educated layman… (altro)

Even though this book is part of a series of introductory surveys on the military history of assorted periods and cultures, Graff still manages to provide as much detail as anyone but a hardened scholar would require. This is as Graff details the impact of steppe nomad cavalry on Chinese Empire 1.0, how the Han elite came to terms with this development in the process of recreating empire, and thus began a series of relationships that continued down to modern times. Graff also does a good job of keeping a balance between operational & strategic detail, the political & sociological context of the period, and providing a good sense of the limitations of the sources that have come down to us. The one limitation of this work is if you want nuts and bolts details on weaponry and costumes. In that case you'll probably want to supplement Graff with the relevant Osprey booklets on the period in question.… (altro)