Nicholas Atkin

At first glance, Philippe Pétain would seem a poor candidate for inclusion in a series dedicated to the study of political power. A career military officer, Pétain became the leader of France in June 1940 only as a result of the collapse of the France’s Third Republic in the wake of its defeat by Nazi Germany. Faced with the collapse of French military resistance and the massive disruption caused by refugees fleeing the advancing Wehrmacht, the National Assembly turned to Pétain in the hope that his enormous national prestige would help to preserve the nation in the midst of its greatest crisis. Though Pétain possessed a degree of authority unknown since the heyday of Napoleon Bonaparte, his true power was constrained by circumstance: namely the ongoing war in Europe and the German occupation of large portions of the country. This power would be constricted further over the next four years, to the point that by the end of the war Pétain was effectively a prisoner of the Germans, presiding over a court of collaborationists whom he detested.

All of this would suggest that any study of Pétain’s political career would be thin gruel at best. Yet Nicholas Atkin demonstrates the fallacy of such assumptions by providing a marvelous examination of Petain’s time as “le Chef,” integrating it into an account of Pétain’s life in both the military and in politics. This, as he demonstrates, is important to understanding his time in office, as not only did this background serve as the basis of Pétain’s national appeal but it also the source of the values on which Pétain sought to rebuild the French nation in the aftermath of its defeat.

The key element of Pétain’s image was his role as the “victor of Verdun.” An obscure career army officer at the start of the First World War, Pétain soon distinguished himself as a general on the Western Front. Part of this was due to his prewar recognition of the importance of firepower on the modern battlefield, which set him apart from his fellow commanders, many of whom believed that courage and sheer numbers would win the day. Once the fighting settled into the grinding conditions of trench warfare, Pétain further distinguished himself with his visits to the front lines, which earned for him a reputation as a humane general who cared about his men. This combination made him the ideal figure to take charge of the epic battle of Verdun, which was for the French the decisive national test of their entire history to that point. France’s victory over German forces in that battle cemented Pétain’s reputation as a national hero.

Throughout the interwar period, Pétain’s image ensured him a place in a succession of prominent military posts and political offices. While Pétain played the political game, like many of his fellow generals he had no love for the incessant infighting of parliamentary politics. Because of this, he seized the opportunity presented by the collapse of the French government in the summer of 1940 to create an authoritarian regime purged of the elements which he detested. Though Pétain despised the left, he distanced himself from the right as well and sought to present himself as above party politics. This was aided by a “cult of the marshal,” which played up his role as the national savior and proved vital to the legitimacy of the Vichy government, even if as Atkin argues it ultimately may have been counterproductive to Pétain’s “National Regeneration” agenda.

What proved more damaging to the fulfillment of Pétain’s aspirations, though, was the continuation of the war, which prolonged what the French expected would be only a temporary occupation of their country. Worse, the collaboration with the Germans gradually undermined the Vichy state’s autonomy and discredited it in the eyes of the French people. This created an opening for Pierre Laval, who despite Pétain’s personal dislike for him was able to use German demands to force his way back into the government in 1942 and reduce the marshal to little more than a figurehead.

Pétain survived the war to face a controversial trial for treason which resulted in his imprisonment for the rest of his life. In the decades since writers and scholars have debated the degree of his complicity, a debate that Atkin addresses throughout his book. While presenting the arguments of all sides he makes his own views of Pétain’s responsibility clear, which he supports with reasoned arguments and references to the evidence. His command of the considerable literature on both Pétain’s career and the Vichy regime is evident throughout his text, and add considerably to the value of his interpretations of his subject. It makes for a book that is a superb introduction to Pétain and his historical legacy, one that nobody interested in the questions surrounding his controversial career can afford to ignore.… (altro)

Nicholas Atkin and Frank Tallett offer the first one-volume historical overview of European Catholicism from the 18th century to 2002. The authors record the Church struggling to adapt to the new political landscape ushered in by the French Revolution and show how the formation of nation states and identities was both helped and hindered by the Catholic establishment. They portray the Vatican increasingly out of step in the wake of world war, Cold War, and the massive expansion of the developing world, with its problems of population growth and under-development. This is not the story of the Church in all its glory, but one of adaptation and change, of decline and resilience as the Church has responded to social, political, and cultural changes over the last 250 years.… (altro)