Listened to as an audiobook and would have been better with a different narrator. But still informative and compelling anyway. ( )

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 is remembered as a short, limited war, successful for the Germans who not only defeated the French but made the final step towards a unified German state. But it isn’t often described in any detail, maybe because Bismarck managed to contain it to a conflict between two parties, and as a historical event it didn’t enter anyone else’s conscientiousness. Perhaps with the exception of Marxists, for whom the Paris Commune that emerged after the war (and its violent suppression) acquired the mythical status of a failed revolution.

Rachel Chrastil’s account describes how this conflict was began, fought and concluded with a focus on the fighting and the consequences of it for the French society and the many victims. She does not dig much into the state politics of it, neither the political actions that started the war, nor the negotiations that ended it. Her focus is on the internal life of the French state, the battles that were fought on its soil, and impact this had on a people. Although this was a war largely fought according to the laws as they then existed, there was plenty of bloodshed, cruelty and suffering. Personal recollections are frequently interwoven into this account account of the conflict.

Chrastil skewers Napoleon III, Bazaine and MacMahon for their military incompetence, which destroyed the credibility of the Second Empire and lead to the foundation of the Third Republic. She sees this, rather than superior German skill, as the cause of the speed of the defeat, though a better organisation of the German mobilisation contributed to their success. Her description of the battles is well written and lucid, but I felt a need for maps: It is confusing when in one fight the French left flank is their southern force, but in the next it is the northern. Incidentally, it makes one wonder how much the French officers of 1940 were still influenced by this memory. When Gamelin refused to consider a military surrender, he might have been thinking of Bazaine’s condemnation for treason.

The aftermath of the defeat was a drawn-out struggle which the French could not win, but the Germans also had difficulty to deal with. It is interesting to ponder what could have happened if the French, like the Chinese in the 1940s, had refused to end the fighting, as many radical voices wanted. But it was undoubtedly the wiser choice in 1871 to negotiate an armistice and a peace, one that was costly for the French, but allowed both sides to get on with their lives. Chrastil repeatedly cites the German crown prince Frederick, a man who hoped that both people would find ways to live in peace. Sadly, Frederick III would rule for only 99 days and be succeeded by the bellicose Wilhelm II.

A crucial legacy of the war of 1870, as Chrastil describes it, was the growing readiness of European powers to mobilise large armies of conscripts and position them on the border, as this had contributed greatly to German success. In the summer of 1914 this would put the war on a hair trigger. ( )

During August and September 1870, the besieged French city of Strasbourg was subjected to more than 44 nights of Prussian shelling, during which its inhabitants were fired at approximately every 20 seconds. Many French people believed that such action contravened international agreements on the conduct of war, but in reality the new laws provided no protection for civilians. The often shocking disparity between how the Franco-Prussian War was waged and how combatants and observers thought it should be conducted exposes a contradiction at the heart of a conflict that was at once traditional and modern.

Major new books on the Franco-Prussian War are rare, especially in English. Rachel Chrastil’s Bismarck’s War will therefore inevitably be compared to Michael Howard’s classic study (1961). Nevertheless, the distinctive style and approach of Chrastil’s book are evident in her assertion that: ‘Mobilisation is an immense logistical challenge, a public relations game, and a feat of emotional management.’ While Bismarck’s War does not shy away from engaging in military analysis, the human dimension is centre stage.

Although it was Napoleon III’s Second Empire that declared war in July 1870, ostensibly on grounds of Prussian provocation, French forces were significantly less well prepared than their Prussian counterparts. French military planning failed to distinguish between mobilisation and concentration, Chrastil explains, causing significant logistical problems from the outset. Late changes to army structure, the mobilisation of inadequately trained national guardsmen, and shortages of horses hindered French ability to take the offensive in the crucial early days of fighting. Prussian mobilisation yielded a force that outnumbered and soon outclassed the French. By early August, German forces had taken the offensive into French territory. Prussian field marshal Helmut Moltke’s aspirations for a quick victory before France had time to gather international allies seemed probable.

Read the rest of the review at HistoryToday.com.

Karine Varley is Lecturer in French History at the University of Strathclyde.